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ABSTRACT 
 
Government provision of land and natural resources has 
provoked major trade disputes over the issue of subsidies.  Yet, how 
to identify the existence of a subsidy when the government is the 
sole or predominant provider—a common phenomenon due to the 
government control of natural resources in many countries—
remains unsettled under the law of the World Trade Organization.  
At the heart of the controversy is the issue of benchmarking.  Since 
the normal benchmark of domestic market prices cannot be properly 
utilized when the market price is the government monopoly price, 
it becomes necessary to resort to alternative benchmarks.  Although 
the WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) has articulated certain principles 
and made some suggestions, what has prevailed in practice is the 
use of external market prices as the benchmark in identifying a 
subsidy in the country of provision.  This approach, however, 
disregards the most basic source of comparative advantage of a 
trading nation: its natural endowment. 
This Article makes several contributions.  First, it traces the 
drafting history of relevant WTO rules and attempts to discover the 
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rationale of an abandoned proposal that would have completely 
changed the legal landscape on the issue of government monopoly 
and subsidies.  Second, it systemically examines WTO 
benchmarking jurisprudence, which has evolved through multiple 
cases involving Canadian softwood lumber, Indian minerals, 
Indonesian timber, and Chinese land.  Third, it highlights the 
concept of resource rent and analyzes how the treatment of resource 
rent in the system of public ownership might affect the application 
of WTO subsidy regulation.  Finally, it proposes the alternative of 
constructing domestic market benchmarks on the basis of optimal 
use of natural resources via economic modeling, which may have 
broad implications for dealing with the special problem of 
subsidization in China. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Market benchmarking is at the heart of subsidy disciplines of the 
World Trade Organization.  Under the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”), a subsidy is 
deemed to exist only if a government’s financial contribution confers 
to the recipient a “benefit,” the existence of which is to be identified 
by comparing it to a chosen benchmark.1  For governmental 
provision of equity, loans, loan guarantees, and goods or services, 
the basis for comparison is the marketplace; that is, what the 
recipient could have obtained in the market without the government 
contribution at issue—a counterfactual situation.  Despite the 
inherent difficulty in constructing counterfactuals, WTO 
adjudicators have established a set of legal positions on market 
benchmarking.2 
In one area, however, the legal position on benchmarking 
remains largely unsettled.  That is where the government is the sole 
provider, or monopolistic supplier, of goods or services.  In such a 
situation, the market price is the price charged by the government, 
hence that price cannot logically be the basis for comparison.  The 
question of how to construct the benchmark in such a situation has 
arisen in several WTO cases involving, respectively, government-
owned timber, minerals, and land.3  Notably, while the position of 
the WTO Appellate Body has shifted between the two cases it has 
reviewed, the benchmark positions taken by WTO panels in the 
other cases were not appealed, which means similar rulings may be 
rejected or modified by the Appellate Body in future cases. 
This Article seeks to analyze the benchmarking problem in the 
context of government monopoly over the provision of natural 
resources, including timber, minerals, and land.  The Article focuses 
on natural resources, rather than all products and services provided 
by government monopoly, for the following reasons: Unlike 
manufactured goods or services, land and other fixed natural 
                                                             
 1 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM]. 
 2 See SCM Agreement—Article 14 (Jurisprudence), WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: 
GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/subsidies_art14_jur.
pdf. [https://perma.cc/THR7-2WFF] (describing methods used by the 
investigating authority to calculate subsidy amounts). 
 3 See generally supra Part 2.2. 
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resources are the “natural endowment” of a nation, thus 
representing the most basic type of comparative advantage in trade.  
Besides, the price of natural resources typically carries rent, which 
merits special consideration.  Furthermore, government pricing of 
natural resources is typically linked to the public policies on 
environmental protection and sustainable development.  In short, 
the special characteristics of land and natural resources warrant 
special consideration in benchmarking. 
At the outset, it is necessary to recognize that the notion of a 
market benchmark is a legal construct of WTO subsidy disciplines.  
It assumes the existence of a fully competitive market, in which 
prices are determined by supply and demand, free from 
government intervention.  It further assumes that there is one 
market price for the good or service at issue that is objectively 
determinable.  In reality, no such ideal market exists, and no single 
market price can be objectively determined.4  Indeed, from an 
economic perspective, it is doubtful that the existing WTO 
regulation is ever capable of identifying government subsidization 
in any meaningful sense.5  Recognizing the legal nature of the 
benchmarking enterprise, however, should not lead to the 
conclusion that all benchmark decisions are ad hoc or inherently 
arbitrary.  Rather, it should help us realize that each judgment on 
benchmarking embodies a policy choice—it reflects the vision of the 
adjudicators on the role of the government in the national economy 
and the proper reach of global governance.  This realization should 
in turn inspire us to explore ways to improve the legal construct of 
the market benchmark, so it will serve the world trade system in a 
more secure and predictable manner.  While this Article focuses on 
the government provision of natural resources, hopefully the 
analysis herein can also shed light on benchmarking in a broader 
context, that is, government monopoly in the provision of all 
products and services. 
                                                             
 4 See Andrew Lang, Governing ‘As If’: Global Subsidies Regulation and the 
Benchmark Problem, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 135–68 (2014) (discussing the inherent 
indeterminacy of market benchmarks); Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of (Perfect) 
Market Benchmarks: The Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1–54 
(2010) (critiquing the market benchmark approach in US countervailing duty law). 
 5 See Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A 
Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 473, 474 (2010); see also Alan O. Sykes, 
The Limited Economic Case for Subsidies Regulation, E15 INITIATIVE (Mar. 2015), 
http://e15initiative.org/publications/the-limited-economic-case-for-subsidies-
regulation/ [https://perma.cc/6HZR-5Y2W]. 
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The Article will proceed as follows: Part II introduces the subject 
of government monopoly and WTO subsidy regulation.  It will 
review relevant SCM rules, the drafting history thereof, and the 
major WTO cases establishing SCM benchmark jurisprudence, and 
highlight unresolved issues concerning the government provision of 
natural resources.  Part III proposes two alternative approaches to 
benchmarking in the case of government monopoly of natural 
resources.  One is the construction of domestic benchmarks based 
on production costs, applying the basic economic theory of rent to 
the cost of production in natural resources.  The other is the 
construction of domestic benchmarks on the basis of optimal use of 
natural resources, requiring the use of economic modeling to 
estimate the proper prices for the efficient allocation of natural 
resources.  Part IV sets out the key conclusions of this study. 
2.  GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY UNDER WTO SUBSIDY REGULATION 
2.1.  SCM Rules and Government Monopoly 
The SCM Agreement establishes WTO’s comprehensive 
disciplines on government subsidies.  Under the SCM Agreement, a 
subsidy is deemed to exist when there is “a financial contribution” 
or “any form of income or price support” by the government, and 
“a benefit is thereby conferred.”6  The “financial contribution” by a 
government is specified to be: (i) a government practice that 
involves a direct transfer or potential direct transfer of funds or 
liabilities (e.g., grants, loans, equity infusion, and loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue otherwise due is foregone (e.g., tax 
incentives); (iii) government provisions of goods or services other 
than general infrastructure, or government purchases of goods; (iv) 
government entrusting or directing a private body to carry out any 
type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii).7 
The issue of subsidy by government monopoly falls generally 
under type (iii), that is, where the government is the sole provider 
                                                             
 6 SCM, supra note 1, art. 1.1. 
 7 Id.  The SCM definition of subsidy has been criticized as being too narrow.  
See Gary Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, Rethinking Subsidy Disciplines for the Future: 
Policy Options for Reform, 20 J. INT’L ECON. REV. 673–703 (2017). 
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of goods or services other than general infrastructure.8  For the 
government provision of goods or services to be a subsidy, it must 
confer “a benefit” to the recipient.  The identification and calculation 
of such “benefit” is to be made by following the guidelines set out 
in SCM Article 14(d): 
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods 
by a government shall not be considered as conferring a 
benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate 
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than 
adequate remuneration.  The adequacy of remuneration shall be 
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good 
or service in question in the country of provision or purchase 
(including price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).9 
Thus, whether the government provision of goods or services 
confers a benefit is to be determined by reference to “prevailing 
market conditions” in the country of provision.  In other words, the 
prevailing market conditions in the country of provision should be 
the benchmark for measuring the adequacy of remuneration 
received by the government. 
2.1.1.  The Circularity Problem 
A problem arises, however, when the government is the sole 
provider of the good or service in question.  In that case, it would be 
circular to compare the remuneration received by the government 
with the market price prevailing in that country for the good or 
service in question, as the market price is the price charged by the 
sole government provider. 
It should be noted that government monopoly in the provision 
of goods or services is a common phenomenon in the modern world.  
Under the laws of many countries, the state owns all the natural 
resources within its territory, hence the government (national or 
subnational) is the sole provider of natural resources.  Such 
countries range from developed economies such as Canada and 
                                                             
 8 When the government is the sole purchaser of goods or services, it is 
monopsony. 
 9 SCM, supra note 1, art. 14(d) (emphasis added). 
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Australia,10 to developing economies such as Mexico, Brazil and 
India,11 to former centrally-planned economies such as China, 
Vietnam and Mongolia.12  With respect to services, government 
monopoly is quite common in postal services, public utilities, and 
telecommunications, although some of these services may qualify as 
“general infrastructure,” and hence may be excluded from the 
definition of financial contribution under SCM Article 1.1. 
It should also be noted that the concern over monopoly is 
typically the high prices that a monopoly may charge, not low prices 
resulting from government subsidies.  In international trade, the 
chief concern has been that a government import monopoly may 
mark up the price of an imported product to protect domestic 
producers of like product.  To prevent such markups, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) imposes certain limits on 
the margin a government import monopoly may charge on 
imports.13  Although an export monopoly may also mark up the 
                                                             
 10 About 89% of Canada’s land is Crown land, which is owned by either 
federal or provincial governments.  See V.P. Neimanis, Crown Land, CAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/Article/crown-
land [https://perma.cc/95AJ-DTBU] (last updated Dec. 16, 2013) (“Less than 11% 
of Canada’s land is in private hands; 41% is federal crown land and 48% is 
provincial crown land.”).  Ownership of Australia’s mineral natural resources vests 
with its states and territories.  Andrew D. Mitchell & Jessica Casben, Natural 
Resources and Energy Regulation in Australia: The Energy White Paper Context, in 
EMERGING ISSUES IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND 
POLICY RELATING TO NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 9–10 
(Mitsuo Matsushita & Thomas Schoenbaum eds., 2016).  Thus, the states and 
territories regulate access to these resources and set costs for access and exploitation 
(on private lands as well as public lands).  Id. 
 11 Ownership of all-natural resources is vested in the nation, as stipulated in 
Article 27 of the Constitution of Mexico.  Similarly, mineral resources and many 
other natural resources are “property of the Union,” as specified in Article 20 of the 
Constitution of Brazil.  While ownership structure is more complex in India, “there 
can be no private ownership of natural resources, and any involvement by the 
private sector is limited to exploration, prospecting and exploration of these 
resources for specified time periods.”  R.V. Anuradha & Piyush Joshi, Natural 
Resources Regime in India: Impact on Trade and Investment, in EMERGING ISSUES IN 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO 
NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 60 (Mitsuo Matsushita & 
Thomas Schoenbaum eds., 2016). 
 12 See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 9, 10 (1982, as amended) (China); HIẾN PHÁP 
NƯỚC CỘNG HÒA XÃ HỘI CHỦ NGHĨA VIỆT NAM [CONSTITUTION] art. 53 (2013) (Viet.); 
MONGOL ULSĪN ÜNDSEN HÚLĬ [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (1992) (Mong.). 
 13 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. II:4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (limiting the margin that an import 
monopoly may charge to the level of tariff findings); id. art. XVII:4(b) (imposing an 
obligation to report “the import mark-up” by an import monopoly on products not 
subject to tariff bindings). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
584 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:3 
prices of exports so as to protect domestic users and to reduce 
supply to foreign users, there is no specific GATT rule regulating the 
pricing of exports by government monopolies.14  GATT does 
obligate all state trading enterprises, including import and export 
monopolies established or authorized by the government, to act in 
accordance with the nondiscrimination principle in their trading 
activities,15 but the obligation is very difficult to enforce due to the 
lack of transparency in the operation of state enterprises.  In any 
event, GATT regulation of a government monopoly is limited to 
trading activity and does not extend to subsidies.16 
By contrast, the concern with government monopoly under the 
SCM Agreement is that the government monopoly may charge too 
low a price for its goods or services.  The SCM Agreement, however, 
fails to address the situation of government monopoly specifically.  
As a result, in order to avoid the circularity problem under Article 
14(d), it becomes necessary to construct the benchmark in 
determining the adequacy of government prices.  But how should 
such a benchmark be constructed?  Should it be based on the price 
that a private monopoly would charge, or the price the government 
could receive in a fully competitive market?  Should the cost of the 
government provision be considered?  Before examining how WTO 
adjudicators have approached the problem, it is enlightening to 
review the solution once contemplated by the drafters of the SCM 
Agreement. 
2.1.2.  Draft SCM Article 14(e):  A Mystery 
It turns out that the drafters of the SCM Agreement did consider 
the situation of government monopoly in the provision of goods or 
services, as well as that of government monopsony in purchasing 
                                                             
 14 See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization art. 31(1)(a), 
Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (recognizing these effects of export 
monopoly).  The lack of GATT rules on export monopoly pricing is not surprising, 
given the lack of commitments on export tariff bindings generally under GATT. 
 15 GATT, supra note 13, art. XVII:1(a). 
 16 In fact, GATT Article II:4 (concerning import monopoly) states that its 
provision “shall not limit the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to 
domestic producers . . . .”  Id. art. II:4.  Moreover, GATT Ad Article XVII effectively 
excludes the “privileges granted [by government] for the exploitation of national 
natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise control 
over the trading activities of the enterprise in question” from the nondiscrimination 
obligation of state trading enterprises.  Id.  Ad art. XVII:1(a). 
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goods or services and offered a definitive answer.  The initial draft 
of SCM Article 14, when it first appeared in late 1990 during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, contained substantially the same 
provisions as the current Article 14, plus one additional paragraph 
(e).17 
The draft Article 14(e) provides: 
(e) When the government is the sole provider or purchaser 
of the good or service in question, the provision or purchase 
of such good or service shall not be considered as conferring 
a benefit, unless the government discriminates among users 
or providers of the good or service. Discrimination shall not 
include differences in treatment between users or providers 
of such goods or services due to normal commercial 
considerations.18 
Thus, Article 14(e) took the position that government monopoly 
and monopsony should not be considered as providing a subsidy, 
so long as the government did not discriminate between domestic 
and foreign buyers or sellers.  Today, such a position might seem 
rather radical, especially in light of the SCM jurisprudence on 
government monopoly subsequently developed under Article 14(d), 
as will be discussed below. 
It appears that the provision of Article 14(e) was derived from 
proposals made by the United States in the negotiating group on 
Subsidy and Natural Resources-Based Products.19  The 
nondiscrimination requirement in Article 14(e) targeted 
government’s two-tier pricing in natural resource sectors.  Two-tier 
pricing occurs when the government owns or controls the 
production of natural resources and provides them to domestic 
manufacturers at below world market prices.20  For example, 
PEMEX, Mexico’s state-owned oil and gas monopoly, sold its 
products to domestic producers at lower prices than those charged 
                                                             
 17 GATT Secretariat, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Negotiating Group on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Draft Text by the Chairman, GATT Doc. 
MTN/GNG/NG10/W/38/Rev.2, at 23 (Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Draft SCM 
Text]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) 502–
3, 942 n. 736 (Terence Stewart ed., 1993). 
 20 Id. at 501. 
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to foreign customers.21  Such two-tier pricing was considered to 
result in a form of subsidy to domestic producers. 
The negotiation record shows that Mexico opposed Article 14(e) 
as drafted and proposed adding the phrase “within its territory” 
after “unless the government discriminates,” so that the 
nondiscrimination requirement would apply to domestic producers 
only.22  Obviously, Mexico’s proposal would have defeated the 
purpose of preventing two-tier pricing.  Nonetheless, the rationale 
provided by Mexico for its proposal is noteworthy.  According to 
Mexico, 
[Draft Article 14(e) means that] countries endowed with 
natural resources renounce their comparative advantages, or 
otherwise that they be exposed to the application of 
countervailing measures in their export markets.  This means 
that National Treatment is applied beyond the territory of 
contracting parties, which is fundamentally inconsistent 
with this basic GATT concept.23 
The reference to comparative advantage based on natural-
resource endowment may have reflected the thinking behind the 
main sentence of Article 14(e).  Except for this reference by Mexico, 
no other explanation can be found in the negotiation records 
regarding the rationale behind Article 14(e).24 
Article 14(e) was deleted in the Draft SCM Agreement of 
December 20, 1991 (the Dunkel Draft), apparently as a result of 
Mexico’s opposition.25  Other than the issue of two-tier pricing, the 
negotiation records do not contain any discussion on the provision 
of Article 14(e). 
In subsequent WTO practice, the position taken in Article 14(e) 
has neither been discussed, nor followed.  Yet, Article 14(e) is not 
merely a historical note for WTO scholars.  As the discussion below 
will show, the general idea of Article 14(e) has the support of basic 
                                                             
 21 Id. 
 22 GATT Secretariat, Trade Negotiations Committee, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures: Communication from the Permanent Delegation of Mexico, 
GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/38 (Nov. 26, 1990). 
 23 Id. 
 24 My research in this regard consists of exhaustive reading of relevant 
negotiation records publicly available and interviews with staff of the WTO 
Secretariat who were involved in, or otherwise familiar with, the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of the SCM Agreement. 
 25 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 19, at 503. 
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economic theories and can shed light on the question of how 
government monopoly should be dealt with under SCM Article 
14(d). 
2.2.  Benchmarking Jurisprudence under Article 14(d) 
To date, the issue of benchmarking in the provision of goods by 
government monopoly (or near monopoly) has arisen in several 
major WTO disputes, all involving government-owned natural 
resources.  SCM jurisprudence on the issue has evolved 
considerably.  Below is an overview of the key findings on the issue 
in these cases. 
2.2.1.  US–Softwood Lumber (IV):26  Canadian Timber 
The Softwood Lumber dispute between the United States and 
Canada is one of the most complex and enduring trade disputes in 
modern history.  Over the past decades, the conflict has generated 
multiple rounds of litigation at NAFTA and the WTO.27  After the 
DSB adopted the Appellate Body’s decision in Softwood Lumber (IV), 
the two governments reached a negotiated settlement in 2006, but 
the settlement expired in October 2015.28  In April 2017, the United 
States began imposing new countervailing duties (CVD) on 
                                                             
 26 Appellate Body Report, United States–Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter AB Report, Softwood Lumber 
IV]. 
 27 For an overview of the multiple litigations, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many 
Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007). 
 28 The settlement was reached in September 2006 for seven years and was 
extended for two years until October 2015.  See Softwood Lumber Agreement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America, Can.-U.S., Sept. 12, 2006, http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-
controles/softwood-bois_oeuvre/other-autres/agreement-accord.aspx?lang=eng 
[https://perma.cc/8TQ8-YZBV]; Agreement between The Government of Canada 
and The Government of The United States of America Extending the Softwood 
Lumber Agreement between The Government of Canada and The Government of 
The United States of America, as Amended, Can.-U.S., Jan. 23, 2012, https://treaty-
accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105335&lang=eng [https://perma.cc/BPM7-
ZG24]. 
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softwood lumber from Canada.29  In November 2017, Canada 
initiated another WTO case against the US CVD on softwood 
lumber,30 which is currently pending. 
The central issue in this lengthy dispute is quite simple: whether 
the Canadian government subsidized lumber producers through its 
stumpage programs.  The difference of opinion between the United 
States and Canada is rooted in the difference in their respective 
forest systems.  In Canada, 94% of the forestland is owned and 
managed by government (Crown land), and only 6% is privately 
owned.31  The government charges “stumpage fees” for harvesting 
timber on Crown land, which are assessed by an administrative 
body.  In setting the stumpage fees, the government may consider 
lumber prices, revenue needs, and other policy goals such as job 
creation and sustainable forest management.32  By contrast, in the 
United States, most of the forestland is privately owned and the 
stumpage prices are determined by the market through auctions.  
From the US perspective, Canada has been subsidizing lumber 
producers with below-market stumpage fees, and it is therefore 
justified in levying CVD on softwood lumber from Canada.  
Denying the existence of any subsidy in its stumpage system, 
Canada has challenged the US CVDs at both NAFTA and WTO 
forums.  Thus far, none of the forums have found that the Canadian 
stumpage programs provided a subsidy. 
US–Softwood Lumber (IV) is the first WTO case that dealt with the 
issue of benchmarking in a situation where the government 
                                                             
 29 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Issues 
Affirmative Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination on Softwood Lumber 
from Canada (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-
releases/2017/04/us-department-commerce-issues-affirmative-preliminary-
countervailing [https://perma.cc/4N3D-TPWU]. 
 30 See Request for Consultations by Canada, United States–Countervailing 
Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS533/1 (Nov. 30, 2017).  
A WTO panel was composed on July 6, 2018.  See Constitution of the Panel 
Established at the Request of Canada, United States–Countervailing Measures on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS533/3 (July 9, 2018). 
 31 Provincial and territorial governments own about 90% of the public 
forestland, while the federal government about owns 4%.  See Gov’t of Can., Forest 
Land Ownership, NAT’L RESOURCES CAN., 
www.nrcan.gc.ca/forests/canada/ownership/17495 [https://perma.cc/7CZM-
ELBK] (last modified Jan. 18, 2019). 
 32 See, e.g., R. Q. Grafton, R. W. Lynch & H. W. Nelson, British Columbia’s 
Stumpage System: Economic and Trade Policy Implications, in 24 CANADIAN PUBLIC 
POLICY—ANALYSES DE POLITIQUES S41–S50 (Supp. S2 1998) (describing how 
stumpage prices were set in British Columbia) [hereinafter Grafton et al., BC’s 
Stumpage System]; see also Dunoff, supra note 27, at 321. 
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dominates the market.  In imposing CVDs on Canadian softwood 
lumber, the US Department of Commerce (“USDOC”) used adjusted 
US stumpage prices as the benchmark to determine the “benefit” 
conferred by Canadian stumpage programs.  According to the 
United States, although there were private stumpage prices in 
Canada, all such prices were distorted due to the predominant 
position of the Canadian government in the timber market; as a 
result, there were no market-determined prices in Canada that could 
be used as benchmarks for Canadian stumpage fees.  In the WTO 
dispute, Canada challenged the US benchmarking decision as 
inconsistent with SCM Article 14(d).  The Panel agreed with Canada, 
finding that because the US acknowledged the existence of private 
stumpage market in Canada, “the resort to US prices as the 
benchmark for the determination of benefit on grounds that private 
prices in Canada were distorted is inconsistent with Article 14(d).”33 
On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding.  The 
interpretive focus was on the second sentence of Article 14(d), which 
states that “[t]he adequacy of remuneration [for the government] 
shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for 
the good or service in question in the country of provision . . . .”34  In 
interpreting this provision, the Appellate Body established several 
legal positions.  First, the Appellate Body construed the phrase “in 
relation to” as to “imply a broader sense of ‘relation, connection, 
reference;’” consequently, an investigating authority is permitted to 
use as a benchmark “something other than private prices in the 
market of the country of provision” so long as it can demonstrate 
that “the benchmark chosen relates or refers to, or is connected with, 
the conditions prevailing in the market of the country of 
provision.”35  In short, by interpreting the phrase “in relation to” 
broadly, the AB opened the door for the investigating authority to 
reject domestic prices in the country of provision as a benchmark 
under Article 14(d).36 
                                                             
 33 Panel Report, United States–Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 7.64, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/R 
(Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Softwood Lumber IV]. 
 34 SCM, supra note 1, art. 14(d). 
 35 AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 89. 
 36 According to Horlick, the AB made a “grave error” by “permitting cross-
border comparisons, which should be anathema in CVD cases” and the AB’s 
interpretation effectively deleted the phrase “in the country” from Article 14(d), 
which phrase had been insisted on by Mexico in the SCM negotiations.  Gary N. 
Horlick, An Annotated Explanation of Articles 1 and 2 of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 297, 299 (2013). 
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Second, the Appellate Body indicated three specific 
circumstances in which an investigating authority may reject 
domestic prices in the country of provision under Article 14(d): (i) 
where the government is the only supplier of the particular goods in 
the country; (ii) where the government administratively controls all 
of the prices for those goods in the country; and (iii) where private 
prices in the country are distorted because of the predominant role 
of the government in the market as a provider of the same or similar 
goods.37  According to the Appellate Body, the third situation is 
where the government has such a predominant role in the market 
that private suppliers will align their prices with government prices 
for the same or similar goods; in other words, where the government 
effectively acts as a “price-setter” and private suppliers are “price 
takers.”38 
Third, the Appellate Body suggested two possible alternative 
benchmarks that may be used in determining the adequacy of 
remuneration for government-provided goods.  They are “proxies 
that take into account prices for similar goods quoted on world 
markets,” and “proxies constructed on the basis of production 
costs.”  The AB emphasized, however, that when using an 
alternative benchmark, an investigating authority is under the 
obligation to ensure that the benchmark “relates or refers to, or is 
connected with, prevailing market conditions in the country of 
provision, and must reflect price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, as required 
by Article 14(d).”39 
Finally, regarding the alternative benchmark used by the 
USDOC in this particular case, the Appellate Body cautioned that “it 
would be difficult, from a practical point of view, for investigating 
authorities to replicate reliably market conditions prevailing in one 
country on the basis of market conditions prevailing in another 
country.”40  The AB ultimately concluded that it was unable to 
complete the legal analysis of whether the USDOC determination of 
benefit is consistent with Article 14(d), because there were 
insufficient factual findings or undisputed facts in the record.41  
                                                             
 37 AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶¶ 98, 103. 
 38 Id. ¶ 99. 
 39 Id. ¶ 106. 
 40 Id. ¶ 108. 
 41 Id. ¶ 122. 
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Consequently, the case did not result in a finding that the Canadian 
stumpage programs provided subsidies to lumber producers. 
Despite the lack of resolution of the dispute at hand, Softwood 
Lumber (IV) established new benchmarking jurisprudence under 
Article 14(d).  Where the government has a predominant role in the 
provision of goods or services, an investigating authority is 
permitted to reject market prices in the country of provision and to 
use an alternative benchmark to make the benefit determination, 
provided that the alternative benchmark is “connected with” 
prevailing market conditions in the country of provision.  What 
constitutes such a connection, however, remains to be determined 
on a case-specific basis. 
2.2.2.  US–AD/CVD (China):42  Chinese Land 
In this dispute, China challenged the USDOC determinations in 
four concurrent antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations as inconsistent with WTO law.43  In two of the CVD 
investigations, the USDOC found that the Chinese government’s 
provision of land-use rights to the producers was for less than 
adequate remuneration, and hence constituted countervailable 
subsidies.  In its benefit determinations, the USDOC rejected all land 
prices in China as being distorted by the government and instead 
used land prices in Thailand as the benchmark.44 
In China, all land is publicly owned, and no private ownership 
of land is permitted.  Such public ownership consists of state 
ownership and collective ownership.  All urban land and mineral 
resources are state-owned, whereas most rural land is collectively 
                                                             
 42 Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R 
(adopted Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter AB Report, US–AD/CVD (China)]. 
 43 The products involved in these AD/CVD investigations were: circular 
welded carbon quality steel pipe, certain new pneumatic off-the-road tires, light-
walled rectangular pipe and tube, and laminated woven sacks.  Panel Report, 
United States–Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Panel Report, 
US–AD/CVD (China)]. 
 44 Id. ¶¶ 10.165–10.167; see also Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s 
Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 67893, 67909 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 3, 2007) 
(preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination); Certain New 
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 
71360, 71369 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 17, 2007) (preliminary affirmative 
countervailing duty determination). 
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owned by the farmers residing thereon.45  For state-owned land, the 
government may “grant” land-use rights to private entities for a fee, 
and the land-use rights so granted can be sold in the secondary 
market.  The state may also “allocate” land for use by state-owned 
entities for a nominal fee, but the allocated use rights are not 
transferrable until full fees for land-use rights are paid.  Collective-
owned land does not have transferable use rights and can only be 
used for the benefit of the members of the collectives.  The 
government, however, may convert collective-owned land into 
state-owned land through requisition upon payment of 
compensation to the collective owners.  Transferable land-use rights 
may be granted through auction, bidding, or by agreement with 
buyers.  Where the grant is made by agreement, the fee charged may 
not be lower than the minimum price set by law.46  The government 
grants land-use rights according to planned purposes for land use 
(such as residential, commercial, and industrial) and may charge 
different fees for different purposes of use. 
According to China, the USDOC acted inconsistently with SCM 
Article 14(d) by rejecting in-country prices and using Thai prices as 
the benchmark for China’s land-use rights.  China claimed that 
private prices exist in the secondary market for land-use rights in 
China, and that the term “prevailing market conditions,” as 
interpreted by the Appellate Body in Softwood Lumber IV, does not 
refer to a “pure market” or a “market undistorted by government 
intervention.”47  Furthermore, China argued that the Thai 
benchmark, 3000 km away, bore no relationship to prevailing 
market conditions in China.48  China additionally submitted that, 
because land is not traded across borders and because its value is 
significantly determined by its location and by the applicable legal 
regime, it is impossible to “replicate reliably” the prevailing market 
conditions for land in one country by referring to land values in 
another country, which has its own physical, social, political, and 
economic environment.49 
The United States countered that USDOC’s use of an out-of-
country benchmark in this case is justified under Article 14(d) as 
                                                             
 45 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 8, 9 (1982) (China). 
 46 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Urban Real 
Estate (1994, as amended), art. 13. 
 47 Panel Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 43, ¶ 10.69. 
 48 Id. ¶ 10.169. 
 49 See id. n.686 (citing the AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 108); 
see also id. ¶ 10.183. 
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interpreted by the Appellate Body in Softwood Lumber IV.  According 
to the United States, the Chinese government not only ultimately 
owns all the land, but also exercises significant control over the 
supply side of the land market; as a result, land prices in both 
primary and secondary markets are distorted.  Given the 
predominant role of the government in China’s land market, the US 
claimed, it was necessary to use an out-of-country benchmark to 
measure the benefits at issue.50  In defending the Thai benchmark, 
the US argued that the USDOC took into consideration several 
factors (comparable per capita GNI, population density, and types 
of land transactions) to ensure that Thai prices reasonably reflect 
prevailing market conditions in China.  The US also submitted that 
due to limited information available it may not always be possible 
for investigating authorities to adjust all of the items listed in Article 
14(d), but that should not preclude a Member from selecting a 
comparison price.  If the bar for selecting the out-of-country 
benchmark is set so high that it requires the use of unavailable data, 
investigating authorities will be required to use in-country prices 
even where they contain the very subsidy that they are trying to 
measure, which would not capture the benefit of the subsidy due to 
the predominant role of the government.51 
The Panel agreed with the United States.  In the view of the 
Panel, based on the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Softwood Lumber 
IV, the USDOC’s finding that the government was the sole supplier 
of the good in question might have been sufficient for a conclusion 
that it could not use in-country prices for land as the benchmark.  
Yet, the Panel noted, the USDOC did not merely rely on the 
government ownership of land for its conclusion; instead, it also 
conducted an extensive analysis of the land-use market in China 
before concluding that land-use prices in China were not set in 
accordance with market principles.52  Satisfied with the USDOC’s 
analysis, the Panel held that China did not establish that the USDOC 
had acted inconsistently with SCM Article 14(d) by rejecting in-
country land-use prices as benchmarks for land-use rights in 
China.53  As for the use of the Thai benchmark, the Panel held that 
Article 14(d) does not exclude, a priori, the possibility of determining 
                                                             
 50 Id. ¶ 10.71. 
 51 Id. ¶¶. 10.175–10.176. 
 52 Id. ¶ 10.77.  Specifically, the USDOC found that land-use rights were still 
transferred via “closed-door” negotiations and not via public auctions, tenders or 
listings as required by law. 
 53 Id. ¶¶ 10.78–10.82. 
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the existence and amount of benefit for subsidies in the form of 
provision of land on the basis of land prices in another country.  
Otherwise, according to the Panel, it would become impossible for 
the investing authority to determine the existence and amount of 
any benefit in situations such as were found to exist in China.54  
Furthermore, the Panel doubted that any adjustments to the Thai 
benchmark could be made to ensure a closer approximation of an 
undistorted land market in China, which is a counterfactual 
situation.  In any event, the Panel found that China had not 
identified any specific adjustment that the USDOC was required to 
make.55  The Panel thus concluded that China had failed to establish 
that the USDOC’s use of the Thai benchmarks was inconsistent with 
Article 14(d).56  China did not appeal the Panel’s rulings on land-use 
rights.57 
2.2.3.  US–Carbon Steel (India):58  Indian Iron Ore and Coal 
In India, the government (states and federal) owns all mineral 
resources on behalf of the Indian public.59  The government grants 
mining leases to companies (public or private) for the exploration 
and exploitation of the minerals in exchange for royalty payments.  
For more than a decade, the United States imposed countervailing 
duties on steel imports from India, alleging that the Indian steel 
producers were subsidized by the government provision of iron ore 
and coal.60  More specifically, the USDOC found countervailable 
                                                             
 54 Id. ¶ 10.184. 
 55 Id. ¶ 10.189. 
 56 Id. ¶ 10.191. 
 57 It is unclear why China decided not to appeal the Panel’s rulings on land-
use rights, considering that it successfully appealed all other major rulings of the 
Panel in this case. 
 58 Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS436/AB/R 
(adopted Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter AB Report, Carbon Steel (India)]. 
 59 Id. ¶ 2.179; see also Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, ¶ 7.73, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS436/R (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report, Carbon Steel (India)]. 
 60 USDOC issued the first of the underlying determinations challenged in this 
case in 2001.  See A. Ramanujan, A. Sharma & S. Seetharaman, US–Carbon Steel 
(India): A Major Leap in Trade Remedy Jurisprudence, in WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT 
TWENTY: INSIDERS’ REFLECTIONS ON INDIA’S PARTICIPATION 235 (Abhijit Das & James 
J. Nedumpara eds., 2016). 
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subsidies in (a) the supply of high-grade iron ore by the National 
Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC), which is 98% owned 
by the government of India, and (b) the grant of “captive mining 
rights” by the Indian government, which allowed the steel 
producers the exclusive rights to mine iron ore or coal for their own 
use in the production of steel.  In calculating the amount of benefits 
conferred, the USDOC rejected India’s domestic prices, and used the 
prices charged by Australian and Brazilian producers to Indian 
buyers, as the benchmarks.  India brought this dispute in 2012, 
challenging the US countervailing measures as inconsistent with the 
SCM Agreement. 
2.2.3.1.  Iron Ore Supplied by NMDC 
With respect to the supply of iron ore by NMDC, India 
challenged the USDOC’s determination that NMDC is a “public 
body” (i.e., a subsidy provider), and the USDOC’s selection of 
benchmarks in the benefit determination.  On the issue of public 
body, the Appellate Body followed its prior ruling that a public body 
is an entity that “possesses, exercises, or is vested with 
governmental authority”61 and found that the USDOC’s public body 
determination was inconsistent with SCM Article 1.1(a)(1), because 
it failed to provide “a reasoned and adequate explanation” for the 
basis of its determination.62 
It was on the issue of benchmarking that the Appellate Body 
significantly developed its jurisprudence under Article 14(d).  Recall 
that in Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate Body had held that, where 
the government has a predominant position in the provision of 
goods or services, an investigating authority is permitted to reject 
in-country prices and use alternative benchmarks in the benefit 
determination.  In this case, the Appellate Body clarified that 
“whether a price may be relied upon for benchmarking purposes 
under Article 14(d) is not a function of its source but, rather, whether 
it is a market-determined price reflective of prevailing market 
conditions in the country of provision.”63  Accordingly, in 
considering in-country prices, an investigating authority may not 
stop at private prices, but must also assess prices of “government-
                                                             
 61 AB Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 42, ¶ 317. 
 62 AB Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.55. 
 63 Id. ¶ 4.154. 
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related entities” other than the entity providing the financial 
contribution at issue.64  If such government prices are market-
determined, they will form part of the benchmarks.  Moreover, the 
fact that governments may set prices in pursuit of public policy 
objectives, rather than profit maximization, does not mean that 
government prices must be discarded in determining a benchmark 
under Article 14(d).65  Having established these positions, the 
Appellate Body found that the USDOC acted inconsistently with 
Article 14(d) by excluding NMDC’s prices from the benefit 
determination and by using Australian and Brazilian prices as the 
benchmarks for the iron ore supplied by NMDC.66 
2.2.3.2.  Mining Rights for Iron Ore and Coal 
With respect to the grant of the captive mining rights for iron ore 
and coal by the Indian government, the initial question was whether 
the grant of such rights constituted the provision of “goods” under 
Article 1.1.  Considering the mining rights as “reasonably 
proximate” to the minerals extracted and enjoyed by the steel 
companies, the Appellate Body answered the question in the 
affirmative.67 
The issue then was whether the grant of mining rights conferred 
benefits to the steel companies, that is, whether the remuneration to 
the government was “less than adequate” under Article 14(d).  Since 
the government of India received only royalties for the grant of the 
mining rights, the inquiry should logically focus on the adequacy of 
the royalty payments as compared with some benchmarks.68  Yet, 
instead of assessing the adequacy of the royalties, the USDOC 
determined benefits by first constructing “a government price for 
iron ore and coal,” which included not only royalties but also the 
costs associated with the extraction of iron ore and coal incurred by 
                                                             
 64 Id. ¶ 4.151 note 740 (stating that the term “government-related entities” 
refers to “all government bodies (whether national or regional), public bodies, and 
any other government-owned entities for which there has not been a ‘public body’ 
determination.”). 
 65 Id. ¶¶ 4.170, 4.287. 
 66 Id. ¶¶ 4.290, 4.316–4.317. 
 67 Id. ¶ 4.75. 
 68 India made this argument and suggested that the adequacy of the royalties 
should be determined in comparison to royalty rates in other countries.  See id. ¶ 
4.324. 
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the steel companies, and then comparing the constructed 
government prices with the benchmarks chosen (i.e., the Australian 
and Brazilian prices charged to Indian buyers).69  Oddly, even 
though the Appellate Body had rejected the USDOC’s determination 
that NMDC is a public body, and even though there was no claim 
that any other recipients of the mining rights involved in this case 
were part of the government, the Appellate Body found that it was 
“permissible” under Article 14(d) to attribute the entire production 
costs of iron ore and coal plus profits to the Indian government.70  It 
appears that the Appellate Body viewed this conclusion as a logical 
extension of its initial finding that the mining rights were proximate 
to the minerals extracted by the right holders.  But these are two 
distinct matters.  The AB’s initial finding addresses the applicability 
of the SCM Agreement to the grant of mining rights, which is an 
entirely different issue from the calculation of remuneration to the 
government for the granting of these rights. 
Its problematic finding on the calculation of remuneration 
notwithstanding, the Appellate Body ultimately disagreed with the 
USDOC’s benefit determination with respect to the iron ore 
supplied by NMDC.  The Appellate Body concluded that the 
USDOC’s benefit determination is inconsistent with Article 14(d) 
because the USDOC failed to provide “a reasoned and adequate 
explanation” of the basis for its use of Australian and Brazilian 
prices as benchmarks for the iron ore.71  However, with respect to 
the provision of coal by the government through the grant of mining 
rights, the Appellate Body declined to find that the USDOC’s use of 
Australian prices as the benchmark was inconsistent with Article 
14(d), and the reason for this decision was not explained.72 
2.2.4.  US–Coated Paper (Indonesia):73  Indonesian Timber 
This recent case bears a close resemblance to Softwood Lumber 
(IV).  As in Canada, most forestland (99.5%) in Indonesia is 
                                                             
 69 Id. ¶ 4.323. 
 70 Id. ¶ 4.332. 
 71 Id. ¶¶ 4.316–4.317. 
 72 Id. ¶ 4.322. 
 73 Panel Report, United States–Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on 
Certain Coated Paper from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS491/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2018) 
[hereinafter Panel Report, Coated Paper (Indonesia)]. 
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government-owned.74  The government charges royalty fees for 
licenses to harvest timber from government-owned land.  The 
royalty fees are set administratively.  The United States imposed 
countervailing duties on certain coated paper products from 
Indonesia, claiming that the Indonesian government subsidized the 
paper producers with cheap timber and logs.75  In calculating 
“benefit” conferred by the supply of timber, the USDOC rejected in-
country prices for timber as benchmarks, on the ground that there 
were no market-determined stumpage fees in Indonesia.  Instead, 
the USDOC constructed the benchmark based on Malaysian log 
export price data from the World Trade Atlas, exclusive of 
shipments to Indonesia.76 
In the WTO proceeding, Indonesia challenged the USDOC’s 
rejection of in-country prices as the benchmark as inconsistent with 
SCM Article 14(d).  In particular, Indonesia submitted that the 
royalty fees payable were for the right to use land, and not for the 
supply of standing timber, because most of the timber at issue was 
not pre-standing but was planted and harvested by the license 
holders in plantations they had built on government-owned land.  
As a result, Indonesia claimed, the government did not own the 
standing timber and had no control over the prices charged by the 
license holders in the timber market.  That being the case, Indonesia 
argued, the royalty fees payable to the government do not constitute 
“remuneration” for the supply of timber.77  The United States 
countered that the royalty fees were stumpage fees, because they 
were tied to the volume of wood harvested from the land, rather 
than the acreage leased.78  Indonesia’s claims were rejected by the 
Panel.  According to the Panel, the question of whether the 
government provided a good in the form of standing timber pertains 
to the finding of a financial contribution under SCM Article 1.1(a).  
Since Indonesia did not challenge the USDOC’s finding under 
                                                             
 74 See id. ¶¶ 7.40, 7.47 (the government’s market share in the market for 
standing timber was over 93% and its ownership of harvestable land in Indonesia 
was approximately 99.5%, with private forests accounting for just 6.27% of the total 
harvest during the period of investigation). 
 75 The measure concerning logs was an export ban on logs imposed by the 
Indonesian government, which is beyond the scope of discussion in this Article. 
 76 Panel Report, Coated Paper (Indonesia), supra note 73, ¶ 7.48.  According to 
the USDOC, it used log prices as the basis for stumpage benchmark because the 
market value of timber is derivative of the value of the downstream products.  Id. 
n.108. 
 77 Id. ¶ 7.42, ¶ 7.42 n.99. 
 78 Id. ¶ 7.43. 
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Article 1.1(a), the Panel must assume the USDOC’s finding on the 
existence of financial contribution was proper.79  Citing the 
predominant market share of the Indonesian government in the 
timber market and the fact that royalty fees were administratively 
determined, the Panel concluded that the USDOC did not err in 
finding that there were no market-determined prices for timber in 
Indonesia.80  In reaching this conclusion, the Panel essentially 
followed the AB’s reasoning in Softwood Lumber (IV). 
Notably, the Panel did not examine whether the out-of-country 
benchmarks selected by the USDOC were proper under Article 
14(d), since Indonesia’s claims were limited to the USDOC’s 
rejection of in-country prices as the benchmark.81 
2.2.5.  The State of Benchmarking Jurisprudence under Article 14(d) 
The benchmarking jurisprudence concerning government 
monopoly has evolved considerably under Article 14(d).  The 
principal position established in Softwood Lumber IV—when the 
government is the predominant supplier in the country, domestic 
prices can be assumed as distorted—was modified by the Appellate 
Body in Carbon Steel (India).  In the latter case, the Appellate Body 
explicitly cautioned against equating price distortion with 
government predominance.  Instead, the Appellate Body held that 
government prices (including prices charged by all government 
bodies, public bodies, and SOEs) may be market-determined; thus, 
government prices other than the financial contribution at issue may 
not be excluded from the determination of market benchmarks, even 
if such prices were set in pursuit of public policy objectives rather 
than profit-maximization.  This shift in the Appellate Body position 
appears to be nothing short of a fundamental change in its view of 
government’s role in the market.  It remains to be seen whether the 
AB’s new position will take hold.82 
Having held that government prices may be market-determined, 
however, the Appellate Body did not specify how an investing 
                                                             
 79 Id. ¶ 7.45. 
 80 Id. ¶ 7.61. 
 81 See id. ¶ 7.28. 
 82 Notably, the Panel in Coated Paper (Indonesia) followed the AB’s position in 
Softwood Lumber IV rather than Carbon Steel (India).  See supra notes 74–81 and 
accompanying text.  Indonesia did not appeal the Panel’s decision. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
600 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:3 
authority should make the relevant assessment.  Conceptually, to 
assess whether a government price is “market-determined,” it is 
necessary to first define the market.  According to the Appellate 
Body, the term “market” refers to “the area of economic activity in 
which buyers and sellers come together and the forces of supply and 
demand affect prices”; “prevailing market conditions” in Article 
14(d) “consist of generally accepted characteristics of an area of 
economic activity in which the forces of supply and demand interact 
to determine market prices.”83  These definitions, while helpful, do 
not address some of the key questions concerning government 
monopoly.  For example, when the government is the sole provider 
of a good in the country, is there a domestic “market” for the good?  
That is, do we recognize the existence of “market” between a single 
supplier and multiple buyers?  What if two or more local 
governments compete in supplying the good or service in the 
country?  Should we recognize such competition or should we treat 
all local governments as one provider for the purpose of Article 
14(d)?84  Does the existence of government monopoly or inter-
governmental competition constitute “prevailing market 
conditions” for the good or service in question in the country of 
provision?  Furthermore, if the government monopoly exports, 
thereby directly competing in the world market for the supply of the 
good or service in question, is the government export price then 
“market-determined”?  The Appellate Body in Carbon Steel (India) 
seemed to think so.85  But if such an export price is market-
determined, does it also “relate to” the prevailing market conditions 
                                                             
 83 AB Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.150 (citing Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 404, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/AB/R/ (adopted Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter AB Report, US–Upland 
Cotton]). 
 84 While the Appellate Body has clarified that investigating authorities “may 
be called upon to examine the conditions of competition” in determining whether 
government-related prices are market determined, it appears to have limited such 
examination to the competition between business entities, including both state-
owned and private entities, but not competition between local governments.  See 
Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China, ¶ 4.62, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter AB Report, US–CVD (China)]. 
 85 In ruling against the USDOC for its rejection of NMDC’s export prices of 
iron ore as possible market benchmarks, the Appellate Body apparently considered 
it possible that NMDC’s export prices (which the Appellate Body had attributed to 
that of the government of India) were “market determined.”  AB Report, Carbon 
Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.290. 
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in the country of provision as required by Article 14(d)?  These basic 
questions remain to be answered. 
Meanwhile, it has been well settled that the government price 
for the financial contribution at issue cannot be used as the 
benchmark, as it would be “inherently circular” if the very 
government price that investigating authorities are seeking to test 
were used as the benchmark itself.86  For this situation, the Appellate 
Body has suggested certain alternative benchmarks under Article 
14(d), including proxies based on prices in world markets, 
constructed prices based on production costs, the export price of the 
government monopoly for like product, and the import price of 
foreign like product.  In addition, the Panel in US–AD/CVD (China) 
has accepted the use of unadjusted foreign market prices as the 
benchmark for government provision of land in China. 
The AB has emphasized that any alternative benchmark under 
Article 14(d) must reflect prevailing market conditions in the 
country of government provision.  But it has not clarified how the 
alternatives it suggested or accepted actually met that standard in a 
given situation.87  As for pure foreign market prices as the 
alternative, the AB has not had a chance to examine such use directly 
under Article 14(d).88  Nonetheless, the AB has explicitly cautioned 
against such use, stating that as a practical matter it would be very 
difficult for the investigating authority to “replicate reliably” market 
conditions prevailing in one country on the basis of market 
conditions prevailing in another country.89 
                                                             
 86 Id., ¶ 4.166. 
 87 There is also an unexplained inconsistency in the AB rulings on the use of 
import prices of foreign like product.  See supra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
 88 Recall that in Softwood Lumber IV, the AB was unable to address this issue 
due to the lack of sufficient information on the record.  In US–AD/CVD (China), 
China did not appeal the relevant Panel ruling.  And in Coated Paper (Indonesia), 
Indonesia did not request the Panel to examine whether the foreign prices used by 
the US as benchmarks were WTO-consistent, nor did it launch an appeal to the 
Panel report. 
 89 AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 108. 
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3.  SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS 
3.1.  Evaluation of Existing Alternative Benchmarks under Article 
14(d) 
In accordance with Article 14(d), the benchmark used to assess 
the adequacy of remuneration for the government provision of good 
or service must be “in relation to” prevailing market conditions for 
the good or service in question “in the country of provision”, and 
such prevailing market conditions include price, quality, 
availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of 
purchase or sale.  As previously discussed, the Appellate Body has 
interpreted the phrase “in relation to” broadly so as to open the door 
for the use of out-of-country benchmarks when the government 
holds a predominant position in the domestic market.90  Yet, the 
door is not so widely open as to allow any tenuous or fictitious 
connection to pass muster, since the AB also cautioned that it would 
be very difficult for the investigating authority to “replicate reliably” 
market conditions prevailing in one country on the basis of market 
conditions prevailing in another country.91  Arguably, “reliable 
replication” is the standard the AB had in mind when it interpreted 
“in relation to” to allow the possibility of using out-of-country 
benchmarks under Article 14(d).  “Reliable replication” of domestic 
market conditions, of course, is a very high standard for any out-of-
country benchmarks. 
To date, five alternative benchmarks have been suggested or 
accepted by WTO adjudicators under Article 14(d).  Of these, the 
Appellate Body has suggested the following four: (i) proxies 
constructed on the basis of production costs; (ii) proxies that take 
into account world market prices for similar products; (iii) export 
prices of the government monopoly in a different transaction (not 
involving the financial contribution at issue); and (iv) import prices 
of foreign like product.  The Panel in US–AD/CVD (China) has 
accepted the fifth (v): market prices of like product in a third 
country.  Of these five alternatives, two are purely out-of-country 
prices (i.e., proxies based on world market prices and prices in a 
                                                             
 90 See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
 91 AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 108. 
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third country) and the other three each have a certain degree of 
connection with domestic market conditions. 
In theory, the choice among all possible benchmarks in a given 
case should be the one that can most accurately reflect (i.e., replicate) 
market conditions prevailing in the country of provision.  Although 
in practice the benchmark selection in each case is necessarily fact-
specific, it is nonetheless possible to evaluate the five alternatives 
according to the degree of their apparent connectivity with the in-
country market conditions: 
• Export prices of the government monopoly for like 
product in transactions other than the financial 
contribution at issue.  This alternative seems to have the 
support of the AB in Carbon Steel (India) with respect to 
the iron ore exported by NMDC.  There are, however, 
some conceptual difficulties associated with this choice.  
Technically, the standard for the benchmark under 
Article 14(d) is that it reflects (or replicates) the market 
conditions in the country of provision.  The pricing of 
exports, in contrast, reflects the supply and demand 
conditions in the world market.92  While the export price of 
the government provider should also reflect the 
conditions of domestic production, without examining 
the conditions of domestic production, one cannot know 
whether such export price (in the transactions other than 
the financial contribution at issue) is itself “subsidized” 
by the government provider.  Logically, if the export 
price of a government monopoly is accepted as the 
benchmark reflecting domestic market conditions, the in-
country prices of the government monopoly must also be 
recognized as market-determined.93  It is unclear 
whether the AB has embraced this position. 
• Proxies constructed based on production costs.  This 
alternative was suggested by the AB in Softwood Lumber 
                                                             
 92 See Appellate Body Reports, Canada–Renewable Energy/Canada–Feed-in Tariff 
Program, ¶ 5.169, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R; WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted 24 
May 2013) [hereinafter AB Reports, Canada–Renewable Energy] (stating “the 
definition of the relevant market is central to, and a prerequisite for, a benefit 
analysis under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.”). 
 93 See, e.g., The Four Types of Market Structures, QUICKONOMICS, 
https://quickonomics.com/market-structures/ [https://perma.cc/LTG8-533Y] 
(explaining that in a standard economy analysis, monopoly is one of the four basic 
types of market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, 
oligopoly, and monopoly). 
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IV.  Production costs of a good are expenses incurred in 
manufacturing the good, including the costs of labor, 
raw materials, manufacturing overhead and a normal 
profit margin.  The costs are typically incurred in the 
country of production and can be ascertained from the 
actual production data.  A cost-based benchmark, 
therefore, is capable of reflecting the prevailing market 
conditions in the country of provision.  One potential 
problem with this method arises when the government 
also dominates the supply of one or more inputs for the 
good in question, in which case the use of another 
alternative may be required.  For whatever reason, this 
suggestion of the AB has not been adopted in practice. 
• The import price of foreign like product.  This was 
accepted by the AB in Carbon Steel (India) as the 
benchmark for coal provided by the Indian government.  
Assuming the import transaction is at arm’s length, the 
actual price paid by the domestic firm for the imports 
must relate to the market conditions in the importing 
country, such as price, quality, and availability of the 
good in question.  However, if all else is equal, it would 
be difficult to understand why the domestic firm would 
be willing to pay more for imports than the cheaper price 
charged by the government provider.  Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether one or two import transactions can 
be considered to reflect the “prevailing” market 
conditions in the importing country for the good in 
question, since the domestic market is still dominated by 
the government provider.94  Unfortunately, the AB in 
Carbon Steel (India) did not provide any explanation for 
its acceptance of this alternative. 
• Proxies based on world market prices for like products.  
This alternative was suggested by the AB in Softwood 
Lumber IV but has not been adopted in practice.  There 
are, however, some conceptual difficulties associated 
with this alternative.  For one thing, if the good in 
question is sold at the world market price, there will be 
no way of knowing whether the pricing of the good has 
                                                             
 94 If the imports were numerous and substantial, then the government 
provider would have to compete with the imports in its domestic market.  In that 
case, the government would no longer have a monopoly and there should be a 
market price for the good in question in the country of provision. 
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benefitted from the very government subsidy under 
investigation.  For another, if the good is sold at a price 
lower than world market prices, using the world market 
price as the benchmark will deny any comparative 
advantage the country of provision might have in the 
good in question.95 
• The price of like product in a foreign country.  This was 
the US approach with respect to Canadian timber, 
Indonesia timber, and Chinese land.  This approach was 
accepted by the Panel with respect to Chinese land but 
has not been examined by the AB in any specific case.96  
As a result, the US approach has prevailed in practice.  
Compared to world market prices, prices in a foreign 
country market are even less likely to be connected with 
to market conditions in the country of provision.  Using 
such foreign prices as the benchmark without 
adjustment deprives the country of provision of any 
comparative advantage it may have in the good in 
question. 
In sum, of the above five alternatives, “proxies constructed on 
the basis of production costs” appears to be the one that is most 
capable of reflecting in-country market conditions.97  While this 
approach has not been adopted in practice under the SCM 
Agreement, the cost of production has been considered appropriate 
                                                             
 95 But see AB Report, US–AD/CVD (China) supra note 42, ¶¶ 500–501 (accepting 
the proxy constructed on the basis of interest rates in 33 lower-middle-income 
countries as the benchmark for commercial loans in China under Article 14(b)).  The 
text of Article 14(b), however, is different from Article 14(d): “[A] loan by a 
government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is a 
difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the 
government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial 
loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.” SCM, supra note 1, art. 
14(b).  Note that this text does not limit the benchmark for loans (“a comparable 
commercial loan . . . .”) to what is available in the domestic market.  Id. 
 96 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 97 Conceptually, constructing benchmarks on the basis of cost of production 
is to be distinguished from the notion of defining the existence of a benefit by the 
cost to the government.  It has been well established that the existence of a benefit 
does not depend on the cost to the government, but on whether the recipient of a 
government financial contribution is made better off as compared to the conditions 
in the marketplace.  See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Measures Affecting the 
Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 154–156, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 
4, 2000) [hereinafter AB Report, Canada–Aircraft] (finding defining the term 
“benefit” in terms of cost to the government is at odds with the plain meaning of 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM). 
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as the benchmark for conducting the benefit analysis in the context 
of agricultural subsidies examined under the Agreement on 
Agriculture, in cases where domestic prices are distorted by 
government-administered prices.98 
3.2.  Constructing Domestic Benchmarks on the Basis of Production 
Costs:  The Question of Rent 
Having concluded that a production-cost based proxy is the 
most preferable among the five alternative benchmarks discussed 
above, we now turn to the construction of such a proxy for the 
provision of natural resources.  Unlike other goods and services, the 
prices of natural resources typically include “resource rent.”99  The 
effect of resource rent on trade was discussed extensively in the US-
Canada softwood lumber dispute under the US-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement, based on the testimony of Dr. William D. Nordhaus.100  
The thesis, however, has not been examined in WTO dispute 
proceedings.  This section will focus on the question of how resource 
rent should be treated in the construction of benchmarks based on 
production costs. 
3.2.1.  Production Costs and Resource Rent 
Production costs of natural resources are costs incurred in the 
entire process of making the resources available to the market.  For 
                                                             
 98 See DOMINIC COPPENS, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES: BALANCING POLICY SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 288–89 (2014) (citing 
AB Reports in Canada–Dairy and in EC–Export Subsidies on Sugar). 
 99 See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES 77 (2010), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr10-2c_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4RPY-Y3FX] (distinguishing between different types of rents 
and defining resource rent); see also Total Natural Resource Rents, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS 
[https://perma.cc/4A7F-74XG] (showing that the World Bank calculates total 
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in all countries and economies for 
the year of 1970 and 2016, respectively). 
 100 See FTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Decision of the Panel 
on Remand, FTA Doc. USA-CDA-1992-1904-01 (Dec. 17, 1993) [hereinafter Decision 
of the Panel on Remand] (discussing extensively Dr. Nordhaus’ testimony and his co-
authored empirical study on the effect of stumpage on timber harvest in British 
Columbia). 
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minerals, for example, production costs should include all expenses 
incurred for the exploration and extraction of the minerals, such as 
labor, materials, equipment, general overhead, and fees paid to the 
owner of the resources, plus a normal profit. 
When the government is the owner of a natural resource, it 
typically grants the right to extract the resource—in the form of 
license or lease—to a party, which may be a private firm or a 
government-owned entity.  In return for granting the right, the 
government may charge fees, known as royalties (for minerals), 
stumpages (for timber in North America), or simply use fees (for 
land in China). 
The fees collected by the government as the owner of land and 
other natural resources represent a form of economic rent.  In 
economics, rent is payment for a factor of production (land, labor, 
capital) in excess of the total costs (including a normal profit) 
necessary to bring that factor into production.  Economic rent is the 
surplus value or return in excess of normal profit.101  For natural 
resources, rent is measured as the difference between the price at 
which a resource can be sold and the costs associated with its 
production, including a normal return.102  More specifically, 
resource rent consists of differential or Ricardian rent and scarcity 
rent.103  Differential or Ricardian rent arises due to the differences in 
the productivity of land (to be further discussed below); scarcity rent 
arises when demand exceeds supply due to natural and legal 
limitations on the supply of the resources.104 
Conceptually, resource rent is the payment to the owner by 
virtue of ownership alone, not including returns on any investment 
the owner has made to improve the land or to make the resources 
available for production.  In short, rent contains no productive 
value.  Fees collected by the government owner are not necessarily 
all rent.  Depending on the specific situation, the fees may also cover 
the costs of government investment in the resource project, or they 
                                                             
 101 See WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 99 
(defining different types of rents, including economic rent). 
 102 K.J. McKenzie & J.M. Mintz, The Tricky Art of Measuring Fossil Fuel Subsidies: 
A Critique of Existing Studies, 4 U. OF CALGARY SPP RES. PAPERS, no. 14, Sept. 2011, at 
14 (defining rent). 
 103 See WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 99 
(identifying three types of rent: differential or Ricardian rent, scarcity rent, and 
quasi-rent, and noting that differential rent and scarcity rent relate to the innate 
characteristics of natural resources, whereas quasi-rent applies to entrepreneurial 
skills). 
 104 Id. 
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may cover investment costs only.  In the latter case, the government 
forgoes the rent it could otherwise charge. 
Under SCM Article 14(d), all fees paid to the government for the 
right to access natural resources have been treated as remuneration 
to the government for the provision of resource products.105  The 
remaining issue is to determine whether such remuneration is 
adequate.  While it may not be difficult to calculate the costs of 
government investment, it is unclear how the adequacy of resource 
rent should be measured. 
3.2.2.  Resource Rent and Its Effect on Trade 
According to the classical Ricardian theory, rent arises from the 
difference in the productive capacity of land: The least productive 
land in cultivation for a produce (e.g., corn) does not carry rent.  The 
price of corn is set by the labor and capital necessary to produce corn 
in the worst land.  All other parcels of land carry rent, as they require 
less labor and capital to produce the same quantity of corn, with the 
highest rent going to the best land in cultivation.  Thus, it is the price 
of corn that determines the rent available, not the other way around.  
And the price of corn is determined by the demand for corn and the 
supply of corn from the least productive land that carries no rent.  
According to Ricardo, because the price of commodities is regulated 
by the margin of production, rent does not enter the price of 
commodities.106 
Modern economic theories have modified Ricardian rent 
theory.107  It is uncontroversial, however, that Ricardian theory 
applies to land with a single use.  Examples of such land include 
                                                             
 105 See AB Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.74 (holding that the 
government’s grant of mining rights is reasonably proximate to the use or 
enjoyment of the minerals by the beneficiaries of those rights). 
 106 See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION 46 (Batoche Books, 2001) (1817). 
 107 For example, in the view of neoclassical economists, Ricardian theory is 
based on the assumption that land has only one use and that there is a fixed supply 
of land; however, in most circumstances land has alternative uses, and each piece 
of land has an opportunity cost which equals the (extra) rent that can be obtained 
in its most profitable alternative use.  That being the case, the rent of land for corn 
is not determined solely by the demand for corn, but also by the price of potatoes if 
growing potatoes is the most profitable alternative use for the land.  In that sense, 
rent enters the price of product.  See ALAN W. EVANS, ECONOMICS, REAL ESTATE, AND 
THE SUPPLY OF LAND 12–14 (2004) (comparing Ricardian theory with neoclassical 
rent theory). 
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mineral-land and timberland.  In addition, where the land use is 
restricted by the government, such as residential or industrial use, 
the Ricardian theory also applies.108  We note that the several WTO 
disputes discussed herein all involve the situation of single-use land. 
The relevant question here is the effect of resource rent on trade.  
Under Ricardian theory, the price of the product is determined by 
the demand for the product and the supply of the least productive 
land that carries no rent.  When the product is traded across the 
border, the demand for the product becomes the total global 
demand, and the least productive land for the supply of that product 
is also to be determined on a global basis.  Thus, rent does not enter 
the price of the product.  It should be noted, however, that from the 
perspective of the producer, rent to be paid to the owner is part of 
her production cost, and hence enters the price of her products.  
However, the producer’s perspective does not address the question 
of how rent arises and what determines the available rent of a given 
piece of land.109 
Logically, if rent does not enter price, it cannot affect trade.  But 
what happens when the owner does not collect all the resource rent 
available?  In that event, the uncollected rent will go to the producer.  
Would the producer increase production or lower prices as a result 
of this rent sharing?  In the case of resource products, because the 
supply is limited by nature (and by conservation laws), the producer 
is unable to produce more than what is available.110  With a fixed 
supply, the producer cannot expect to sell more by lowering prices.  
Hence, the producer will have no incentive to sell below the market 
price, which is determined by the global demand and the supply of 
the least productive land globally.  While the uncollected rent by the 
owner will benefit the producer financially, it will not change the 
price and quantity of the resource product sold to the market by the 
                                                             
 108 Id. at 11, 17–19 (discussing the relevance of Ricardian rent theory to the 
planning controls over land in modern Britain, concluding that the price of land is 
determined by demand when the supply of land for each use is fixed within the 
planning system). 
 109 See generally Frank T. Carlton, Price and Rent, 26 Q.J. ECON. 523–527 (1912) 
(discussing how differential rents arise). 
 110 The producer may be able to increase production by improving 
technological capacity, in which case the producer will earn quasi-rent, which is 
separate from the resource rent owed to the owner. 
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producer.111  In other words, the uncollected rent by the owner has 
no market-distorting effect on trade in the resource product.112 
If resource rent does not distort trade, then there should be no 
issue of adequacy of such rent under Article 14(d).  Consequently, the 
rent charged by the government for providing natural resources—
to the extent they represent rent in single-use land—should be 
excluded from the benefit determination under Article 14(d). 
As noted above, depending on the specific situation, the fees 
charged by the government may consist of rent as well as a return 
on government investment in the resources (such as the 
expenditures on making the resources available).113  Since rent in 
single-use land is irrelevant to the benefit determination, the only 
issue is to determine whether the fees collected by the government 
cover its expenditures in full.  If the fees are less than the 
government expenditure (also known as the case of negative rent114), 
there is presumably a benefit conferred. 
3.2.3.  Tax Equivalent of Resource Rent:  The Case of Government 
Monopoly 
When the government is by law the owner of all natural 
resources, its right to collect resource rent, whether as royalties or 
land-use fees, is no different from its power to collect taxes.115  Like 
                                                             
 111 See John E. Orchard, The Rent of Mineral Lands, 36 Q.J. ECON. 290–318 (1922) 
(explaining that mineral rent will go to either the owner of the land or the operator 
of the mine and that neither consumer nor laborer will share the rent); see also 
Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32 (demonstrating that BC’s stumpage was 
not responsive to changes in the amount of available rent). 
 112 This was essentially the same conclusion reached by the binational review 
panel in the US-Canada softwood lumber dispute.  See Decision of the Panel on 
Remand, supra note 100. 
 113 It is suggested that in the case of minerals, part of the royalty paid to the 
owner is compensation for the depletion of minerals, which should be considered 
as assets and not economic rent because mineral-land, unlike agricultural land, 
cannot be replenished.  See Orchard, supra note 111, at 294–96 (distinguishing rent 
of mineral land from agricultural land).  Under this theory, the fees charged by the 
government should also cover the costs associated with resource depletion, 
including compensation for environmental damage caused by the production of 
resources. 
 114 For instance, where the government pays for a road to a mine in a remote 
area, which is otherwise uneconomical to explore. 
 115 See McKenzie & Mintz, supra note 102, at 13–14 (arguing that royalties are 
a fiscal instrument used to collect revenue from the oil and gas sector). 
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taxes, rent does not represent the value of any productive effort; 
instead, it is merely a fiscal instrument of the government to collect 
revenue based on its sovereign authority.  Seen in this light, it would 
be a misnomer to call the resource rent collected by government as 
remuneration under Article 14(d), since the concept of remuneration 
implies compensation in exchange for work or services 
performed.116  Rather, for purposes of the SCM Agreement, it is 
conceptually more appropriate to treat government collection of 
resource rent as analogous to government collection of taxes.117 
Government revenue “that is otherwise due is foregone or not 
collected” is one of the three types of financial contribution by 
government defined in SCM Article 1.1.118  Unlike the other two 
types of financial contribution—government transfer of funds and 
government provision of goods or services—there exists no market 
benchmark for determining whether a benefit is conferred by 
foregone government revenue.  As the Appellate Body noted, “[a] 
Member, in principle, has the sovereign authority to tax any 
particular categories of revenue as it wishes.  It is also free not to tax 
any particular categories of revenues.”119  The difficult task, 
therefore, is to identify a defined, normative benchmark for 
determining what is otherwise due in a given situation.  The case law 
has so far established two general principles.  First, the normative 
benchmark for determining government revenue otherwise due 
must be the rules established by each Member for itself.120  Second, 
the normative benchmark must allow a comparison of the fiscal 
                                                             
 116 See Remuneration, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/remuneration 
[https://perma.cc/P3UQ-T5NY] (defining remuneration as “Money paid for work 
or a service”). 
 117 However, to the extent that the fees charged by the government exceed the 
rent available and represent, instead, returns for government investment or services 
performed relating to the resources, it will be appropriate to treat such fees as 
“remuneration” falling under Article 14(d).  It should also be noted that the 
Appellate Body has recognized the possibility that the same transaction may be 
characterized as different types of financial contribution under SCM Article 1.1.  See 
AB Reports, Canada–Renewable Energy, supra note 92, ¶ 5.120. 
 118 SCM, supra note 1, art. 1.1. 
 119 Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales 
Corporations”, ¶ 90, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2000) 
[hereinafter AB Report, U.S.–FSC]. 
 120 See id. (“What is ‘otherwise due’ . . . depends on the rules of taxation that 
each Member, by its own choice, establishes for itself.”).  For a critique on the 
benchmark for tax subsidies, see Sykes, supra note 5, at 5 (“The benchmark for the 
situation that would prevail ‘otherwise,’ however, is largely arbitrary and 
dependent on the form rather than the substance of government tax policies.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
612 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:3 
treatment of taxpayers in comparable circumstances.  In other 
words, “like will be compared with like.”121 
The same principles should apply to the normative benchmark 
for determining resource rent otherwise due.  Like in the tax 
situation, a Member has the sovereign authority to collect all the 
resource rent available in the country and is also free not to collect 
any of such rent.  Whether to collect, and how much to collect, 
depends on the rules a Member establishes for itself.  In other words, 
there can be no “external” benchmark for determining what is the 
resource rent otherwise due.  The rules established by the Member, 
however, must allow a comparison of treatment of rent-payers in 
like circumstances.  Because fixed natural resources are typically 
unique in their location and value, thus each carrying a different 
amount of rent, the only meaningful comparison of treatment will 
often be between rent-payers with respect to the same resource.  Put 
differently, to the extent each piece of land carries its own rent, the 
normative benchmark for the rent otherwise due should be 
whatever amount of the fees the government sets to collect from any 
potential renters (users) of a particular piece of land.122  An example 
of such a benchmark is the royalty or use fees offered by the 
government to all bidders of a particular resource.  Accordingly, 
when the government does not discriminate between users with 
respect to the fees payable for a resource, there would not be a case 
of foregone rent. 
Interestingly, this conclusion echoes the basic idea of Draft SCM 
Article 14(e).  As noted above, Draft Article 14(e) provides that 
“[w]hen the government is the sole provider . . . of the good or 
service in question, the provision . . . of such good or service shall 
not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless the government 
discriminates among . . . purchasers of the good or service.”123  
Although its rationale remains unexplained, the wisdom of Article 
14(e) can be confirmed, at least in the context of government 
provision of natural resources, by the tax equivalent theory. 
                                                             
 121 Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales 
Corporations”–Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, ¶ 90, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002). 
 122 Strictly speaking, the amount of rent set by the government must be within 
the range of available rent from a particular resource.  If the amount charged by the 
government exceeds the available rent (after covering the cost of government 
investment), the excess is technically not resource rent, but pure taxes. 
 123 1990 Draft SCM Text, supra note 17, at 23. 
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The tax-equivalent theory of resource rent is not only 
conceptually sound, but also is easy to implement.  Unlike Ricardian 
or neoclassical rent theories, the application of which would require 
calculation of rent for each piece of land, under the tax-equivalent 
theory whether a benefit is conferred by the government provision 
of natural resources can be simply determined by applying the same 
principles of nondiscrimination as in the case of government 
taxation under SCM Article 1.1. 
It should be cautioned here that the tax-equivalent theory 
applies only to the situation where the government is the sole or 
predominant provider of a natural resource in the country.  Where 
the government is one of many providers of a resource in the 
country, it is merely a participant in the resource market, without 
the rent-charging power analogous to the power of taxation.  In such 
a situation, the amount of rent available to the government is 
determined by the market.  If the government foregoes that rent, it 
will have conferred a benefit within the meaning of Article 14(d).124 
3.2.4.  A Normative Perspective:  Comparative Advantage Based on 
Systemic Differences 
In principle, the WTO does not interfere with the property 
ownership regime of its Members, as each country is entitled to 
choose its own political, social and economic systems under 
international law.125  Accordingly, where a Member adopts a system 
of public ownership of natural resources, that choice should be 
accepted as a given under WTO law.  In the system of public 
ownership of natural resources, the government is entrusted to 
manage the exploration, distribution, and conservation of the 
nation’s natural resources.  Compared to countries with primarily 
                                                             
 124 For example, the Appellate Body found that the government lease of an 
industrial site near Hamburg conferred a benefit on Airbus within the meaning of 
SCM Art. 1.1(b), based on the value of generally available industrial land in 
Hamburg, plus a certain premium for the location and customized features that was 
not included in the rent paid by Airbus.  See Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, ¶¶ 989–990, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/AB/R (adopted June 1, 2011) 
[hereinafter AB Report, EC-Large Civil Aircraft]. 
 125 See generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970), 
http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm [https://perma.cc/HQ5R-UUBB]. 
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private ownership of natural resources, the government in the 
public ownership system plays a much more extensive role in the 
resource sector.  The normative question is whether such a role 
should be recognized as legitimate under the SCM Agreement. 
In this regard, it is particularly instructive to quote Adam Smith, 
who famously described rent-seeking landlords in these words: 
As soon as the land of any country has all become private 
property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap 
where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its 
natural produce.  The wood of the forest, the grass of the 
field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land 
was in common, cost the laborer only the trouble of 
gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional 
price fixed upon them.  He must then pay for the license to 
gather them; and must give up to the landlord a portion of 
what his labor either collects or produces.  This portion, or, 
what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, 
constitutes the rent of land . . . .126 
Thus, in accordance with Adam Smith, it would be morally 
salutary that the government not seek rent from natural resources.127  
Instead, in a country where natural resources are publicly owned, 
the government should only manage the use of natural resources for 
the public interest. 
From a normative perspective, when the government “foregoes” 
rent in a country of public ownership of natural resources, any price 
advantage the producer may gain from such “foregone” rent should 
be deemed a system-wide comparative advantage, rather than 
categorically trade-distorting.  In a sense, the government 
management of a nation’s natural resources can be likened to 
government provision of public services.  Wherever the government 
provides extensive public services, such as transportation, 
education and healthcare, businesses can benefit from the resulting 
                                                             
 126 ADAM SMITH, Of the Component Parts of the Price of Commodities, in THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), http://geolib.com/smith.adam/woncont.html 
[https://perma.cc/7CL9-ZBJU]. 
 127 In this regard, the US government sets a remarkable example.  Under the 
General Mining Act of 1872, US citizens can explore and extract valuable minerals 
on federal lands without paying royalties to the US government.  For a defense of 
the system, see Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, 
Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under the General Mining Law of 1872, 34 
ENVTL. L. 745 (2004) (arguing that the attacks on the General Mining Act of 1872 
misunderstand the statute’s incentives). 
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lowered costs of production.128  As a result, the country with better 
public facilities and infrastructure enjoys a system-based 
comparative advantage.129 
It is important to note that government provision of “general 
infrastructure” is excluded from the definition of “financial 
contribution” under the SCM Agreement, and hence not subject to 
SCM disciplines.  The rationale for this exclusion appears to lie in 
the general availability of infrastructure to all potential users,130 
which comports with the SCM principle that only specific 
government subsidies are objectionable.131  But, ultimately, the 
exclusion of general infrastructure from SCM disciplines is a matter 
of respecting the choices of individual Members in the system of 
public works that lay down the economic foundation of a country.132  
Public ownership and government management of a nation’s 
natural resources is one such choice.  Thus, so long as the 
government does not discriminate between purchasers (i.e., making 
the nation’s natural resources available to all potential users) its 
provision of the resources should not be targeted by SCM 
disciplines.133  Interestingly, this again is the underlying notion of 
Draft Article 14(e). 
                                                             
 128 On the other hand, businesses may be subject to high taxes that are used to 
fund the government services. 
 129 In this sense, government policy or regulatory regime becomes another 
“factor endowment”, albeit a man-made one.  See Gilbert Gagné, Policy Diversity, 
State Autonomy, and the US-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute: Philosophical and 
Normative Aspects, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 699, 715 (2007). 
 130 See Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States-Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/R, ¶ 7.1036 (June 30, 
2010) (defining the term “general infrastructure” as “infrastructure that is not 
provided to or for the advantage of only a single entity or limited group of entities, 
but rather is available to all or nearly all entities.”). 
 131 See SCM, supra note 1, art. 2.  The assumption behind the notion of 
specificity is that any effect of generally available subsidies on international 
competitiveness will be counteracted by an offsetting movement in exchange rates.  
But it is unclear that generally available subsidies will not distort trade from an 
economic standpoint.  See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures 4–5 (U. Chi. Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 
186, 2003); see also LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND 
EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 360–64 (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
(discussing divergent economic views on the issue). 
 132 See RUBINI, supra note 131, at 364–66 (suggesting that the true rationale for 
the specificity requirement is one of political economy). 
 133 Unfortunately, WTO jurisprudence has developed in the opposite 
direction.  A natural resource, due to its inherent characteristics, is used typically 
by a limited group of enterprises or industries.  Ignoring such inherent 
characteristics, WTO adjudicators have agreed with the United States that Canada’s 
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3.2.5.  Application of the Theories 
It is instructive to see how the application of the above theories 
might affect the benchmarking analysis in the four WTO cases 
discussed above. 
3.2.5.1.  Canadian Timber 
The central interpretive issue in this ongoing dispute is whether 
the stumpage fees charged by the Canadian governments for the 
right to harvest timber are “less than adequate remuneration” 
within the meaning of Article 14(d).  Recall that most of the 
timberland in Canada is owned by provincial, territorial or federal 
government, and that the government sets stumpage rates 
administratively, taking into account lumber prices, revenue needs 
and other policy goals, including job creation and sustainable forest 
management.134  While the stumpage fees represent the resource 
rent of timberland, the fees actually collected by the government do 
not exactly match the amount of rent available.  For example, 
according to a study on British Columbia’s stumpage system, during 
a 25-year period (1970–1994), the government of British Columbia 
collected more than the available rent in seven years, and less than 
the available rent in 18 years.135  The study shows that by 
overcharging or undercharging, as compared to rent available, the 
stumpage system had a varying impact on the industry and on 
government policy goals.136  For SCM purposes, only the situation 
of undercharging may raise concern: Does the collection of less than 
available rent constitute inadequate “remuneration” of the 
government under Article 14(d)? 
Under Ricardian theory, rent does not affect the supply or price 
of timber, because the supply is limited by the number of trees 
                                                             
provision of timber and India’s provision of iron ore were de facto specific, even 
though there was no evidence of government discrimination between users.  See 
Panel Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 33, at ¶ 7.125; AB Report, Carbon Steel 
(India), supra note 58, at ¶ 4.398. 
 134 See supra text accompanying notes 31–32. 
 135 See Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32, at S47 tbl.2. 
 136 See id. at S48 (suggesting that rent overcharging may cause less than a 
desirable number of trees being cut, job losses in the industry and other 
consequences, whereas undercharging may lead to excess investments that 
ultimately reduce employment). 
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available to be cut (which is also subject to conservation regulations) 
and given the fixed supply the price is determined by the demand.  
The rent uncollected by the government will go to the producer of 
timber, but will not lower the timber price, as the producer cannot 
sell more timber by lowering the price.  This is the very argument 
successfully made by Canada in the softwood lumber dispute under 
the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.137  The British Columbia 
study mentioned above suggests that the uncollected rent might 
have been used in several ways, including increased returns to the 
shareholders of lumber companies, higher wages to forestry 
workers, and increased capital investments and capacity in the 
industry beyond what is necessary to process the available timber.138 
Under the tax-equivalent theory, the stumpage fees charged by 
the Canadian government are in essence a special resource tax levied 
on timber harvesting.  As in taxation, the government collects the 
stumpage revenue by virtue of its sovereign power, not by a claim 
to the remuneration for its services.  Also, as in taxation, the 
government sets the rate of stumpage administratively, taking into 
account its public policy objectives.  Thus, like the treatment of taxes 
under the SCM Agreement, whether the government has provided 
a financial contribution by foregoing its stumpage revenue 
“otherwise due” will depend on the comparison of the stumpage 
revenue received with the generally applicable stumpage rate set by 
the government for itself.  So long as each government applies a 
single rate to all timber producers in its territory, as is apparently 
the case here, there is no revenue foregone, hence no subsidy can be 
found to exist under the SCM Agreement. 
From the normative perspective, public ownership and 
government management of timber resources in Canada is part and 
parcel of its socio-economic system.  If Canadian stumpage rates are 
generally lower than those prevailing in the United States, which has 
a very different ownership and market structure for timber 
resources, then Canada apparently has a system-based comparative 
advantage in timber trade.139  This advantage is not fundamentally 
different from other system-based comparative advantages enjoyed 
by Canadian producers, such as its publicly funded national 
healthcare.140 
                                                             
 137 See Decision of the Panel on Remand, supra note 100. 
 138 Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32, at S46. 
 139 See generally Gagné, supra note 129. 
 140 For example, according to the Canadian government, Canada’s auto parts 
operations enjoy a 31.1% saving on total labor costs relative to their US 
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In sum, when applied to Canadian stumpage, each of the three 
theories analyzed in this section leads to the same conclusion: the 
Canadian stumpage system does not give rise to a financial 
contribution that confers a benefit within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement. 
3.2.5.2.  Indonesian Timber 
The same analysis for the application of the three theories can be 
made in the case of Indonesian timber.  Compared to Canada’s 
stumpage fees, the rent nature of Indonesia’s royalty fees is even 
more pronounced, as the fees were charged to the license holders for 
growing timber on the government land.141  It is immaterial whether 
the rent was calculated based on the quantity of timber harvested or 
the acreage of forestland leased. 
3.2.5.3.  Indian Minerals 
As owner of all mineral resources in the country, the 
Government of India grants the right to mine iron ore and coal to 
state-owned as well as private entities in exchange for royalty 
payments.  For SCM purposes, the central interpretive issue should 
be whether the royalty payments received by the Indian government 
are less than adequate remuneration within the meaning of Article 
14(d). 
In theory, the royalties collected by the government represent 
the resource rent of mines, but in practice they typically do not 
match the amount of available rent in each mine.142  If the royalty 
collected by the government is less than the available rent from a 
given mine, then the remaining rent will go to the mining company.  
                                                             
counterparts, and lower costs of employee healthcare form the greatest part of these 
savings.  See Gov’t of Can., Canada’s Cost and Tax Advantages–Automotive (2017), 
www.international.gc.ca/investors-
investisseurs/assets/pdfs/download/factsheet-automotive-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DAC7-RAD8]. 
 141 See Panel Report, Coated Paper (Indonesia), supra note 73, at ¶ 7.42, n.99. 
 142 The typical mismatch between available rent and royalty charged is due to 
the fact that “[r]oyalty rates are set by government fiat—there is no market-
determined royalty rate that is the analog of a market price.” McKenzie & Mintz, 
supra note 102, at 13. 
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While enriched by the rent, the mining company cannot increase the 
supply of minerals at will,143 nor will it have the incentive to charge 
below-market prices given the fixed supply.  Consequently, the rent 
shared by the mining company should not have market-distorting 
effect on trade in minerals.  The issue of less than adequate 
remuneration would otherwise arise in the situation of negative rent 
(i.e., if the royalty collected is less than the government expenditure 
on the mine) whether in the form of investment or service.  That 
situation, however, was not alleged in this case. 
In essence, the royalty charged by the Indian government is a 
special resource tax.  Thus, as long as the government applies the 
same royalty rate to all potential miners, there should be no revenue 
foregone within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.  As the record 
shows, the government of India does not discriminate between 
potential miners with respect to the allocation of mining rights or 
payment of royalty.144 
3.2.5.4.  Chinese Land 
Compared to timber and minerals, land has certain unique 
features.  First and foremost, land is not a tradable good.  Unlike 
timber and minerals, which are commodities traded globally, there 
is no world market for land.145  Also, unlike timber and minerals, 
land is a necessary input for all production activities.  How these 
unique characteristics of land may affect trade has not been much 
discussed; rather, land has been treated in the same manner as all 
other tradable goods in SCM jurisprudence.146 
                                                             
 143 The total supply of minerals is fixed by nature.  While it is theoretically 
possible that the mining company may use the rent income to hire more labor or 
equipment to increase the production capacity, whether that is indeed the practice 
needs to be tested in each case. 
 144 See Panel Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 7.201 (stating that 
India granted mining rights for iron ore on a first-come-first-served basis). 
 145 Land, together with labor and money, are known as fictitious commodities, 
which do not behave in the same way as true commodities because they are not 
produced to be sold on a market.  Unlike true commodities, the supply and demand 
for the fictitious commodities must be managed through the political process, that 
is, through the power of government.  See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 71–79 
(Beacon Press, 2001) (1944). 
 146 See, e.g., Panel Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 42; AB Report, EC-
Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 124. 
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As previously discussed, in China, all transferable land is owned 
by the state and the government grants land-use rights in exchange 
for land-use fees.  In practice, local governments control land use in 
their own jurisdiction within the broad parameters of national laws.  
Land use is divided into different categories according to planned 
purposes, such as industrial, commercial and residential, and the 
term of use varies depending on the category.  The land-use fees 
may be set through auction or by agreement subject to certain 
minimum prices. 
In contrast with the price of resource products such as timber 
and minerals, the price of land is all rent (unless the owner has made 
land improvements).147  Due to the strict land-planning system in 
China, each piece of transferable land in the country is essentially 
land for a single use.  Thus, according to Ricardian rent theory, the 
price of land-use right for a given piece of industrial land (to the 
extent it is all rent) is determined by the demand for the products of 
the land—say a gadget—and the supply of land that is the least 
desirable for producing the same gadget.148  The desirability of the 
land for producing the gadget depends on factors ranging from local 
transportation and infrastructure, to labor quality and costs, to the 
macro economic and political environment in the country. 
However, because land is not the final product in trade, the effect 
of land price on trade in gadgets might be somewhat different from 
the case of resource products.  Compared to the production of 
timber or minerals, the supply of gadgets is likely to be limited more 
by capital and labor than by land.  That being the case, when the 
government does not collect all the available rent from a given piece 
of land, the uncollected rent may enable the producer to increase 
production or lower prices.  Whether this occurs has to be 
determined in each specific case.  But to the extent it occurs, the rent 
of land foregone by the government may have an effect on trade. 
From a normative perspective, however, the government in a 
country of public ownership of land is not supposed to seek rent, 
but to manage land use in the public interest.  Thus, when the 
                                                             
 147 The price of resource products covers not only rent to the owner of the 
resource, but also the cost of labor and capital for producing the products. 
 148 See Carlton, supra note 109, at 525 (“[D]ifferential rent, which is a measure 
of desirability, appears because of the existence of a demand for various products 
or goods coupled with the presence of land of varying grades of desirability . . . . 
With a given land supply, present or potential, and no change in industrial 
methods, differential rents increase and decrease as the demand for products 
varies.”). 
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government foregoes rent in such a country, any price advantage the 
producer may gain therefrom should be deemed as a system-wide 
comparative advantage. 
Moreover, the case of China’s land-use fees highlights the tax-
equivalent theory of rent.  As is well known, land-use fees are the 
functional equivalent of property tax in China, counting for one-
fourth to one-third of total revenues for the local governments.149  
Thus, just as in the case of taxation, whether the land-rent foregone 
constitutes government revenue that is otherwise due within the 
meaning of SCM Article 1.1 depends on the generally applicable 
level of land-use fees set by the local government itself.  If the 
government charges all users the same level of land-use fees for 
comparable land, there is no foregone revenue within the meaning 
of Article 1.1.  Conversely, if the government charges a user land-
use fees at a level lower than the generally applicable one, a case of 
foregone revenue may be established. 
3.2.5.5.  Summary 
This section applies economic rent theories to the provision of 
natural resources by government monopolies, with the objective of 
identifying the trade-distorting potential of such provision.  The 
resort to rent theories is warranted, given that the return (or 
“remuneration”) for the government’s grant of right to use natural 
resources typically consists of rent.  In order to determine whether 
the “remuneration” to the government is adequate under SCM 
Article 14(d), it is necessary to understand how rent affects trade. 
The key insights from the application of rent theories are: 
(1)  With respect to resource products, such as timber and 
minerals, the amount of rent uncollected by the government does 
not affect trade in the resource products.  That is because the supply 
of a resource product is relatively fixed (i.e., limited by nature and 
conservation laws), and the price of the product is therefore set by 
the demand.  Any rent uncollected by the government will go to the 
producer but will not increase the quantity or lower the price of the 
resource product. 
                                                             
 149 See Donald Clarke, Has China Restored Private Land Ownership?, FOREIGN 
AFF. (May 16, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/Articles/china/2017-05-
16/has-china-restored-private-land-ownership [https://perma.cc/26E6-SQ8H] 
(discussing local government revenue breakdowns, portions of which come from 
land-use fees). 
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(2)  With respect to land for industrial use, the rent uncollected 
by the government may affect trade if it has enabled the producer to 
increase production or lower prices.  That is so because land is not a 
good in trade, but a factor of production for all industries.  In a 
system of public ownership of land, however, whether the 
government collects rent or how much rent it decides to collect from 
state-owned land is a matter of public policy.  Therefore, it is 
normatively inappropriate to deem the rent foregone in such a 
system as categorically trade-distorting.  Whether the rent foregone 
is trade-distorting in a specific case can be determined rationally by 
applying the principle of nondiscrimination. 
(3)  Conceptually, rent is not “remuneration” because it is not 
compensation for labor or return on capital.  Government’s right to 
collect rent is the same as government’s right to collect taxes.  
Technically speaking, therefore, rent should be treated as 
government revenue under SCM Article 1.1, rather than as 
remuneration for government provision of goods or services under 
Article 14(d).  Whether the rent foregone is otherwise due can be 
determined by the same criteria for foregone tax revenue. 
The one exception is the case of negative rent, that is, the amount 
of resource fees collected by the government is less than 
governmental expenditures on making the resources available for 
production.  In such a case, a benefit can be identified within the 
meaning of Article 14(d), because the fees are less than adequate 
remuneration for the government investment. 
3.3.  Constructing Domestic Benchmarks on the Basis of Optimal Use 
of Resources:  A Different Alternative 
In addition to the five alternatives that have been suggested or 
accepted by the WTO adjudicators, it is also possible to construct 
domestic benchmarks based on specific policy objectives.  This 
section explores such a possibility. 
3.3.1.  Constructing Domestic Benchmarks in Light of the SCM 
Objectives 
Domestic benchmarks may be constructed in different ways, 
depending on one’s understanding of the objectives of WTO subsidy 
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discipline.  Unlike most WTO agreements, the SCM Agreement does 
not have a preamble or provision setting forth its objectives, which 
reflects the lack of agreement among Members on this score.150  The 
Appellate Body has described the object and purpose of the SCM 
Agreement as “[T]o strengthen and improve GATT disciplines 
relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures, 
while, recognizing at the same time, the right of Members to impose 
such measures under certain conditions.”151  Yet this description 
says little about the rationale of WTO subsidy disciplines. 
There are generally two schools of thought concerning the 
purpose of international regulation of government subsidies.152  One 
is the injury-only school, which focuses on the adverse effects of 
government subsidies on producers of other countries, thus seeing 
the purpose of international regulation as mainly to remedy such 
adverse effects.  Indeed, the prohibited and actionable subsidies 
under the SCM Agreement are all based on their adverse effects on 
foreign producers.153  This conception of SCM disciplines is 
producer-oriented, reflecting the traditional GATT approach to the 
regulation of international trade.  In accordance with this 
conception, government subsidies are not objectionable unless they 
cause injurious effects to the producers of other Members.  By 
contrast, the anti-distortion school focuses on the market-distorting 
potential of government subsidies broadly.  From this perspective, 
the main purpose of international regulation is to ensure proper 
function of the market and to achieve economic efficiency on a 
global basis.  This conception of the SCM discipline finds support in 
the overall objectives of the WTO, including “the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development”, as stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement.154  
Viewed through this lens, government subsidies are suspect of 
market-distorting measures unless proven otherwise. 
                                                             
 150 See M. Cartland et al., Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 992 (2012); see also RUBINI, supra note 131, at 56–
57. 
 151 AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 64. 
 152 See RUBINI, supra note 131, at 43 (describing the differences between the 
injury-only school and the anti-distortion school). 
 153 See SCM, supra note 1, art. 4 (“prohibited subsidies,” which are assumed to 
cause adverse effects); id. arts. 5, 6.3 (“actionable subsidies,” which require proof of 
adverse effects). 
 154 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter the WTO Agreement]. 
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How might these two schools of thought approach the task of 
constructing domestic benchmarks differently?  In theory, the 
injury-only school, with its producer-oriented thinking, should find 
it quite appropriate to construct the domestic benchmark based on 
production costs.  After all, the cost of production provides a fair 
basis for comparison between domestic and foreign producers.  The 
anti-distortion school, on the other hand, would not care much 
about the cost of production.  For this school, assessing the adequacy 
of remuneration for the government provision of natural resources 
does not involve the issue of rent—whether any rent foregone by the 
government may have a trade-distorting potential is not the 
concern.  Instead, what matters is whether the price charged by the 
government for its resources is set at the right level for the optimal 
use of the resources.  Compared to the injury-only school, the 
approach of the anti-distortion school will result in a more 
expansive reach of global governance at the expense of the domestic 
policy space.155 
This more expansive model of global governance appears to 
have the support of the United States.  Not known for its love of 
global governance, the Trump administration has paradoxically 
endorsed this approach when it comes to protecting the interests of 
US domestic producers.  According to Robert Lighthizer, the US 
Trade Representative, what the United States wants in trade is “a 
system that leads to greater market efficiency throughout the 
world,” which he described as “the underlying objective” of 
organizations like the WTO.156  To achieve that objective, said 
Lighthizer, the United States will take steps to “discourage non-
economic capacity all around the world.”157 
There is also reason to believe that the Appellate Body may agree 
with the anti-distortion school when it comes to benchmarking.  
After all, it is the AB that adopted “the marketplace” as the sole basis 
                                                             
 155 It has also been recognized that some government subsidies do not cause 
“trade injury,” but may harm the global commons by contributing to the depletion 
of scarce natural resources.  Examples of such harmful subsidies include those to 
the production of fossil fuel and the fisheries sector, which are not disciplined by 
the SCM Agreement.  See Horlick & Clarke, supra note 7 (discussing the negative 
externalities of subsidies). 
 156 See Lighthizer, at APEC, Says Defending U.S. Market Against Unfair Trade is 
Not Protectionism, INSIDE US TRADE (May 21, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/daily-
news/lighthizer-apec-says-defending-us-market-against-unfair-trade-not-
protectionism [https://perma.cc/AZ7C-HVGY]. 
 157 See id.  For a critique of presenting economic efficiency as the purpose of 
countervailing duty law, see Zheng, supra note 4, at 46–50. 
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for identifying a benefit under Article 14.158  According to the AB, 
“the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in 
determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’, because the 
trade distorting potential of a ‘financial contribution’ can be identified 
by determining whether the recipient has received a ‘financial 
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those available to the 
recipient on the market.”159  Moreover, the AB has aimed for an 
undistorted-market benchmark rather than accepting the market-as-
it.160  Given this penchant, the AB may well be willing to accept 
benchmarks that are designed to identify and correct distortions in 
the subsidizing country. 
It should be kept in mind that benchmarking and benefit 
determination under SCM Article 14 addresses the issue of whether 
a subsidy exists within the meaning of SCM Article 1.1.  In the words 
of the AB, it is used to identify the “trade distorting potential” of a 
financial contribution.  Whether such a potential has been realized 
(i.e., whether a subsidy has caused injury or other adverse effects to 
producers of other Members) requires further inquiries under the 
SCM Agreement.161  While a subsidy is disciplined by the WTO only 
when it is found to have caused adverse effects to foreign producers, 
the different conceptions of the SCM objectives can lead to different 
conclusions on whether a subsidy exists in the first place.  Under the 
broad vision of the anti-distortion school, any financial contribution 
that is found to distort the domestic market can be deemed a subsidy 
within the meaning of SCM Article 1.1, irrespective of its impact on 
trade. 
The challenge for implementing this broad vision lies in the 
design of benchmarks that will set a price level conducive to 
achieving the specific policy objective, based on prevailing domestic 
conditions.  The subsection below discusses certain possibilities. 
                                                             
 158 Historically, an alternative benchmark used by the USDOC was 
“preferentiality”, which defines subsidy by examining whether the government 
provided more favorable treatment to some than to others within the same 
jurisdiction, rather than by comparing government’s provision of goods or services 
to the “market.”  See Zheng, supra note 4, at 8–21 (tracing the history of evolution of 
market benchmarks under US law and WTO law). 
 159 AB Report, Canada–Aircraft, supra note 97, ¶ 157. 
 160 See Zheng, supra note 4, at 27. 
 161 See SCM, supra note 1, arts. 3, 5, 6, 15, 16. 
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3.3.2.  Benchmarking via Economic Modeling:  Example of Land 
Pricing in China 
In contrast to the construction of benchmarks based on 
production costs, which gives rise to the issue of rent, the 
construction of benchmarks on the basis of optimal use looks to the 
efficient allocation of resources as the sole criterion.  This 
benchmarking approach would entail the construction of a 
counterfactual situation in which resources are allocated efficiently, 
a task for which economic modeling is well suited.  Below is an 
example showing how economic modeling might help discover the 
proper prices of industrial land use in China. 
3.3.2.1.  Non-Optimal Use of Land in China 
Land use in China is divided into two general categories: 
agricultural land, which is mostly owned by the collectives of 
farmers, and urban construction land, which is owned by the state.  
Urban construction land is further divided into several categories, 
including residential, commercial, industrial, and comprehensive.  
The government controls land use according to planned purposes.  
In principle, collective-owned land may not be used for non-
agricultural purposes, except when used by the members of the 
collective.  The State may convert agricultural land into urban 
construction land upon paying compensation to the collective-
owners.  In recent decades, the conversion of large areas of 
agricultural land into urban construction land has enabled rapid 
urbanization and industrialization in China.  The fast reduction in 
agricultural land, however, has prompted the government to 
impose strict restrictions on the expansion of urban construction 
land, as it views insufficient land for agriculture as a threat to 
China’s food security.162 
One major problem in China’s land use is inefficiency in the use 
of industrial land.  According to official statistics, of the urban 
construction land supplied in 2016, 23.3% was allotted for industrial 
                                                             
 162 The central government has set 1.8 billion mu (300 million acres) of 
farmland as the minimum (“red line”) necessary to safeguard food security in 
China.  See generally Zhang Zhilong, ‘Red line’ policy protects China’s arable land, 
CGTN (Feb. 23, 2019), 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514d316b444f32457a6333566d54/index.html. 
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use, 6.7% was allotted for commercial services, 14.1% was allotted 
for residential use, and 55.9% was allotted for infrastructure and 
other uses.163  The prices of land-use rights diverged significantly 
among different types of uses.  At the end of 2016, the average prices 
for comprehensive, commercial, residential, and industrial land 
were RMB3826/m2, 6937/m2, 5918/m2, and 782/m2, respectively.164  
While the prices of residential and commercial land have 
skyrocketed over time, the price of industrial land has risen only 
modestly.165 
The low price of industrial land can be attributed directly to 
China’s industrial land policy and to the intense regional 
competition in the efforts to attract external investment.166  To spur 
economic development in the 1990’s, the government adopted the 
policy of offering cheap land as a major incentive for private 
investment in manufacturing and other production activities.  In 
response, numerous industrial parks and economic development 
zones have sprung up on the outskirts of Chinese cities, turning 
China into the “world factory.”  Although the central government 
has subsequently taken steps to curb the overexpansion of industrial 
land, mandating that all industrial land-use rights must be granted 
through the market mechanism of “bid, auction, and listing” and 
that the minimum price for industrial land must not fall below the 
cost of land acquisition,167 it has set the national standards for the 
minimum prices of industrial land at a very low level.168  Meanwhile, 
local governments are in charge of land use, and have discretion 
                                                             
 163 MINISTRY OF LAND AND RES. (CHINA), 2016 ZHONGGUO GUOTU ZIYUAN 
GONGBAO [2016 REPORT ON CHINA’S LAND AND RESOURCES] 4 fig.7. 
 164 Based on data collected from 105 main urban areas in China.  See id. at 5 
fig.9. 
 165 According to one study, from 2004 to 2015, the price of commercial land 
rose by 20 times, whereas the price of industrial land merely 5 times.  See Professor 
Zhou Lian: China’s Urban Expansion, GUANGHUA SCH. MGMT. (July 13, 2017), 
http://english.gsm.pku.edu.cn/index/en/P9600690371377241735259.html?clippe
rUrl=1495/56296.ghtm [https://perma.cc/AM6F-49AB]. 
 166 See, e.g., Yuzhe Wu et al., Industrial Land Price and Its Impact on Urban 
Growth: A Chinese Case Study, 36 LAND USE POL’Y 199, 199–209 (2014) (discussing 
attempts by local governments to attract foreign investment through a low 
industrial land price strategy). 
 167 See State Council (China), Circular of the State Council on Issues 
concerning the Strengthening of Control over Land (Aug. 31, 2006). 
 168 The government divided the urban land for industrial use into 15 classes 
according to geographic locations and set the minimum pricing standard for each 
class.  See Ministry of Land and Natural Res. (China), Circular on National 
Standards for the Minimum Pricing of Industrial Land (Dec. 31, 2006). 
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over the allocation between different uses of urban land within their 
jurisdiction.  Under the existing system, local officials have strong 
incentives to build factories, as industrial production creates jobs, 
generates stable tax revenues and boosts local GDP, which has been 
the chief criterion for evaluating their job performance.169  The result 
has been intense inter-regional competition in the attempt to attract 
external investment, driving down the prices of industrial land 
towards the minimum level mandated by the central government.170 
The low pricing of industrial land has led to inefficient use of 
urban construction land, causing the destruction of agricultural land 
and the spread of industrial pollution to large sprawling areas 
surrounding Chinese cities.  The expansive industrial land has also 
squeezed out available urban land for other uses, pushing up the 
prices of residential and commercial properties in major cities.  
Furthermore, overexpansion of industrial land has also contributed 
to production overcapacity in China. 
In sum, industrial land in China is not priced at a level that 
achieves an optimal use of land resources and sustainable 
development.  This problem is well known to the government.  In 
its 2013 blueprint for deepening reform in China, the Communist 
Party offered a vision for building an ecological system, which 
specifically called for “raising the price of land for industrial use” 
and for the construction of “a comparative pricing mechanism” to 
identify the proper price ratio of industrial and residential land.171 
                                                             
 169 See Zhi Wang, Qinghua Zhang & Li-An Zhou, To Build Outward or Upward? 
The Spatial Pattern of Urban Land Development in China (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2891975 
[https://perma.cc/GCX6-HVGU] (studying the phenomenon that the fastest-
growing Chinese cities have undergone outward expansion of urban land 
development with relatively low use intensity); see also Xiao Wang & Richard Herd, 
The System of Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers in China 8 (OECD Economics Dept., 
Working Paper No. 1030, 2013) (showing that taxes on businesses accounted for 
more than half of the tax revenue of Chinese local governments in 2011). 
 170 See Wu et al., supra note 166; see also Xialong Zhang et al., Industrial Land 
Price Between China’s Pearl River Delta and South Eastern Regions: Cooperation or 
Competition? 61 LAND USE POL’Y 575, 575–586 (2017) (suggesting that the regional 
competition for attracting foreign investment by low land prices might have 
extended to adjacent regions in neighboring countries). 
 171 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, The Decision on 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform, para. 53; see also The 
Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in Brief, 
CHINA DAILY (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-
11/16/content_30620736.htm [https://perma.cc/MAQ6-CXM3]. 
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3.3.2.2.  Developing Economic Models to Estimate the Proper 
Price of Industrial Land 
To achieve the goal of optimal land use in China, it would be 
desirable to estimate the “right” price level for industrial land.  In 
recent years, economists have engaged in studies on the relative 
pricing of industrial and residential land.172  Their research shows 
that the supply of land for industrial use in China is significantly 
higher than that in most other countries.  In China, industrial land 
typically takes up 30–40%, and residential land merely 20–30%, of 
urban areas, whereas in other countries industrial land on average 
occupies 5–15%, and residential/commercial land 60–70%, of urban 
space.173  Although countries with different systems and at different 
stages of economic development may adopt very different land use 
policies, land use planning is common in modern economies.174  
Thus, it is at least theoretically possible to estimate the rational price 
ratio between industrial and residential land for a specific Chinese 
city by reference to foreign cities of similar traits that are considered 
successful in achieving efficiency in land use. 
The “oversupply” of land for industrial use in China 
corresponds to the low prices of industrial land.  Utilizing data 
collected from different regions, economists have developed various 
models to estimate the proper price of industrial land in different 
locales.  For example, based on an empirical study of 35 large and 
medium-sized Chinese cities, Cao and Wang calculated the 
equilibrium price of industrial land using the present value of 
annual rents derived from the estimated production function of the 
land.175  From the equilibrium price of industrial land, the authors 
further calculated the equilibrium price ratio between industrial 
land and residential land in different parts of China.  They estimated 
                                                             
 172 For a survey of the various studies, see Song Zhao & Chao Li, Review on 
Studies of the Industrial Land Market and Comparison of Industrial and Residential Land 
Prices, 29 ZHONGGUO TUDI KEXUE [CHINA LAND SCI.] 4–10 (June 2015).  See also Wu et 
al., supra note 166. 
 173 See Zhao & Li, supra note 172, at 5. 
 174 See generally Land-Use Planning Systems in the OECD: Country Fact Sheets, 
OECD (2017) http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regional-
development/land-use-planning-systems-in-the-oecd_9789264268579-en 
[https://perma.cc/W6UA-WXFV] (containing a survey of 32 OECD countries and 
their land-use planning systems). 
 175 See Qingfeng Cao & Jiating Wang, Reasonable Ratio Between China’s 
Industrial Land and Residential Land: An Empirical Study of 35 Large and Medium-Sized 
Cities, 318 CAIJING KEXUE [FIN. & ECON.] 88–98 (2014). 
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that, for the period of 2003 to 2012, the average equilibrium price 
ratio of industrial versus residential land should be 0.43, whereas 
the average real price ratio of industrial over residential land was 
only 0.17, indicating the extent of underpricing of industrial land.  
The authors also found that the equilibrium price ratio of industrial 
versus residential land varied from city to city, depending on the 
specific production structure of the city.  Generally, cities with large 
industrial bases (such as Tianjin and Shenyang) have a much higher 
ratio (above 0.6) than cities without such bases (such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, below 0.2).176  One criticism of this study, however, is that 
the authors did not evaluate whether the pricing of residential 
land—the basis for comparison—is rational.177  Indeed, other studies 
have detected structural deviations of land prices in China.  The 
prices of residential land and commercial land tend to deviate 
positively from their theoretical value, as local governments rely 
heavily on the sale of residential and commercial land for local 
financing, which pushes up the prices; in contrast, the price of 
industrial land deviates negatively from its theoretical value 
because local governments compete with each other to attract 
external investment for industrial development, which drives down 
the prices.178 
While such studies may be further refined, they have presented 
a feasible approach to the construction of market benchmarks 
aiming at the efficient allocation of land resources in China.  Adding 
strength to the method of identifying proper price ratios between 
industrial land and residential land is the new government policy to 
make all residential land-use rights freely renewable without 
preconditions.179  The new policy, once enacted into law, will turn 
what are in essence fixed-term land leases into perpetual ownership, 
thus effectively restoring private ownership of urban land in 
China.180  Following this development, prices of residential land-use 
rights will reflect the value of fully privatized urban land, which in 
                                                             
 176 Id. at 92. 
 177 See Zhao & Li, supra note 172, at 7. 
 178 See Bai Xue, Fiscal Decentralization, Intergovernmental Competition and the 
Structural Deviation of Land Prices, 276 CAIJING KEXUE [FIN. & ECON.] 49–57 (2011). 
 179 See China Mulls Law Revision on 70-Year Land Use Right of Properties: Premier, 
CHINA DAILY (Mar. 15, 2017), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-
03/15/content_28567765.htm [https://perma.cc/G3KB-69KV] (reporting the 
statement of Premier Li Keqiang at a press conference that the land use rights for 
residential properties “can be renewed without application or preset conditions.”). 
 180 See Clarke, supra note 149. 
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turn may provide a more reliable reference for calculating the 
proper prices of industrial land.  For the purpose of benchmarking 
under Article 14(d), the approach has the most important virtue of 
being grounded in prevailing conditions in China.  Aside from using 
actual data collected in China—such data have become readily 
available in recent years181—the economic models are built upon 
assumptions of certain systemic constraints, such as the segregation 
of the land market between urban and rural areas, and the 
government control on the aggregate supply of urban land.  
Although these constraints may constitute ultimate barriers to the 
efficient allocation of land resources,182 they cannot be overcome 
without fundamental reform of China’s economic system.  Until 
such reform occurs, it is more appropriate to accept the systemic 
constraints as part of the “prevailing” market conditions within the 
meaning of Article 14(d). 
Similar to land pricing in China, it should be possible to use 
economic modeling to construct domestic market benchmarks for 
natural resources provided by a government monopoly in any 
country, based on the policy objective of optimal use and 
considering relevant systemic constraints.  In this regard, we note 
the extensive research undertaken by the WTO on trade in natural 
resources, which examined how markets can help to promote 
resource management and sustainable development.183 
3.3.2.3.  Special Implications for Dealing with Subsidization in 
China 
The approach of constructing domestic benchmarks via 
economic modeling can have broad implications for dealing with 
                                                             
 181 See Wang Long & Yang Yang, The Privilege of Power and Wealth: Evidence 
form China’s Urban Land Market (Sept. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://zoeyangyang.weebly.com/uploads/9/2/7/7/92771398/china_land.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/83SN-FUZE] (claiming the use of representative dataset of 
316,320 transactions of land use rights from 2000 to 2016 in 2,300 countries of urban 
China, collected from websites of local land authorities and of the Ministry of Land 
and Resources). 
 182 See USDOC, Memorandum on China’s Status as a Non-Market Economy 
107–15 (Oct. 26, 2017), https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-
status/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP8N-PEXB] 
(describing barriers to the efficient allocation of land resources). 
 183 See generally WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra 
note 99. 
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the problem of subsidization in China.  In recent years, grave 
concerns have been raised by the United States and others over the 
impact of China’s state-led capitalism on global trade.184  Chief 
among them is the extensive support the government provides to 
China’s domestic industries, which allegedly has caused market 
distortions worldwide but cannot be effectively disciplined by the 
WTO rules.185  Citing these concerns, the United States and the EU 
refused to terminate China’s “nonmarket economy” (NME) status in 
their antidumping regimes by December 10, 2016,186 the date on 
which the provisions concerning China’s NME status were set to 
expire under China’s Accession Protocol.187  Treating China as NME 
allows an importing Member to use prices in a “market economy” 
country as the normal value to determine whether Chinese products 
are dumped (the surrogate country method), which has typically 
resulted in affirmative determinations with high dumping margins.  
The permission to treat China as NME in antidumping measures is 
one of the special rules of China’s Accession Protocol that depart 
from the standard provisions of the WTO Agreement.188  In response 
to their refusals to terminate its NME status, China filed WTO 
                                                             
 184 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S 
WTO COMPLIANCE (2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WT
O%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P84E-E69F] [hereinafter USTR 2017 China 
Report]; Eliana Raszewski & Luc Cohen, U.S., EU, Japan Slam Market Distortion in 
Swipe at China, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/Article/us-
trade-wto/u-s-eu-japan-slam-market-distortion-in-swipe-at-china-
idUSKBN1E62HA [https://perma.cc/25RV-4BE3]. 
 185 See USTR 2017 China Report, supra note 184, at 2; see also Mark Wu, The 
“China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261–324 (2016). 
 186 See USDOC, supra note 182; see also Eur. Comm’n, Commission Staff Working 
Document on Significant Market Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of 
China for the Purpose of Trade Defence Investigations (Dec. 20, 2017) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6RQ-K6BY]. 
 187 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO 
Doc. WT/L/432, §§15(a) and 15(d) (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter China’s Accession 
Protocol] (§15(a)(ii) permits an importing Member to use a methodology “that is 
not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China” if the 
relevant Chinese producer cannot clearly show that “market economy conditions” 
prevail in the industry; and §15(d) states that the provisions of §15(a)(ii) “shall 
expire 15 years after the date of accession”, i.e., by December 10, 2016). 
 188 See generally Julia Y. Qin, ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for 
the World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 
37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, (2003) (identifying the numerous provisions in China’s 
Accession Protocol that exceed the requirements of the multilateral WTO 
agreements). 
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complaints against the United States and the EU respectively.189  The 
ongoing litigation promises to be one of the most significant 
disputes in WTO history.190 
These high-profile NME disputes, however, have detracted 
attention from another provision in China’s Accession Protocol that 
allows a Member to treat China as an NME in anti-subsidy actions 
without any time limit.  Section 15 of the Protocol states that “the 
SCM Agreement shall apply in proceedings involving imports of 
Chinese origin into a WTO Member” “consistent with” the 
provision of paragraph (b): 
(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM 
Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in Articles 
14(a), 14(b) 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the SCM 
Agreement shall apply; however, if there are special 
difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member 
may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the 
subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility that 
prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be 
available as appropriate benchmarks.  In applying such 
methodologies, where practicable, the importing WTO 
Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions 
before considering the use of terms and conditions 
prevailing outside China.191 
Thus, the Protocol authorizes the importing Member to use 
external benchmarks in identifying subsidies in China under certain 
conditions.  Similar to the NME antidumping provision, Section 
15(b) recognizes, albeit implicitly, the possibility that “nonmarket 
economy” conditions may continue to exist in China after its WTO 
                                                             
 189 See Request for Consultations by China, United States–Measures Related to 
Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016); Request for 
Consultations by China, European Union–Measures Related to Price Comparison 
Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS516/1 (Dec. 15, 2016). 
 190 The stake in this litigation is apparently so high that the USTR warned that 
“a bad decision” in this case “would be cataclysmic for the WTO.”  Shawn Dannon, 
Trump Trade Tsar Warns Against China ‘Market Economy’ Status, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4d6ba03e-56b0-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f 
[https://perma.cc/2BE2-XWG9]. 
 191 China’s Accession Protocol, supra note 187, § 15(b) (emphasis added). 
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accession.  But unlike the NME antidumping provision, Section 
15(b) does not have a built-in expiration date.192 
To date, the importing Members have made little use of Section 
15(b).  Thanks to the AB’s expansive interpretation of Article 14(d) 
in Softwood Lumber IV, the importing Members, especially the United 
States and the EU, the two major users of CVD against China,193 have 
been able to resort to external benchmarks in calculating Chinese 
subsidies under SCM Article 14 without the help of Section 15(b).194  
This state of affairs, however, may soon change.  For one thing, as 
discussed above, the AB’s benchmarking jurisprudence has evolved.  
Following its holdings in Carbon Steel (India) that government prices 
may be market-determined even when they are set to achieve policy 
objectives,195 the AB held in US–CVD (China) that “the selection of a 
benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d) cannot, at the outset, 
exclude consideration of in-country prices from any particular 
source, including government-related prices other than the financial 
contribution at issue.”196  In addition, one should keep in mind that 
the AB has never directly examined the use of foreign country prices 
as the benchmark for government provision of goods or services 
under Article 14(d) in any specific case, but it did suggest a fairly 
high standard for such use: the benchmark based on foreign prices 
should be capable of “replicating reliably” the prevailing domestic 
                                                             
 192 The rationale for the permanency of this provision is not provided in the 
accession documents.  See generally Julia Y. Qin, The Conundrum of WTO Accession 
Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legitimacy, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 369 (2015). 
 193 As of the end of 2017, of the total of 129 CVD measures against China 
initiated by WTO members, 68 were initiated by the United States and 12 by the 
EU.  Source: WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9FZX-
V3Q8]. 
 194 Although the United States observed that Section 15(b) of China’s 
Accession Protocol confirms the permissibility of using out-of-country benchmarks 
to measure a benefit in CVD measures against China, it has not invoked Section 
15(b) in any of its CVD investigations against China or in any WTO litigation.  See 
Panel Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 42, ¶¶ 10.9–10.12, 10.26, 10.70.  Like 
the United States, the EU has routinely resorted to external benchmarks to calculate 
China subsidies.  For example, regarding land-use rights, the EU has used land 
prices in Taiwan as the benchmark.  See Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 1379/2014 of Dec. 16, 2014, Imposing a Definitive Countervailing Duty on 
Imports of Filament Glass Fiber Products from China, 2014 O.J. L367/22; 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/366 of Mar. 1, 2017, Imposing 
Definitive Countervailing Duties on Imports of Crystalline Silicon Products from 
China, 2017 O.J. L56/1. 
 195 See supra text at notes 63–65. 
 196 AB Report, US–CVD (China), supra at note 84, ¶ 4.64. 
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market conditions.197  In light of this standard, it may be only a 
matter of time before the surrogate country methods are successfully 
challenged under Article 14(d).198  Moreover, should the United 
States and the EU lose their case in the ongoing NME disputes, they 
may well decide to utilize Section 15(b) of the Protocol so as to 
continue levying special duties on imports from China.  Indeed, to 
the extent that the United States and the EU attribute low prices of 
Chinese products to “market distortions” by direct and indirect 
government subsidies, their complaints should be addressed by 
WTO subsidy disciplines rather than by the antidumping regime.199 
When invoking Section 15(b), the importing Member would be 
required to prove the existence of “special difficulties” in the 
application of SCM Article 14 to China, and then to make 
adjustments to the prevailing terms and conditions in China before 
considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside 
China.  Although the latter requirement is qualified by the phrase 
“where practicable”, it remains the treaty obligation of the 
importing Member to make a good faith effort to adjust prevailing 
terms and conditions in China.  This required step—adjusting 
prevailing terms and conditions in China—is the same as 
constructing domestic benchmarks for China. 
It is suggested here that using economic modeling to construct 
domestic benchmarks based on the criterion of optimal allocation of 
resources in China is one desirable approach to making the 
adjustments required by Section 15(b).  Normatively, this approach 
is fully consistent with the WTO objectives of the optimal use of the 
world’s resources and sustainable development.  Politically, the 
approach is desirable for at least two reasons.  First, benchmarks 
constructed on the basis of the optimal allocation of resources in 
China may help guide Beijing to deepen market-oriented economic 
reforms, which is also an official objective of the Chinese 
government.200  Second, using constructed domestic benchmarks 
instead of surrogate country prices, which is inherently arbitrary, 
                                                             
 197 See supra text at note 40. 
 198 For example, it is difficult to see how the USDOC’s use of land prices in the 
greater Bangkok area as the benchmark for land 3000 km away in China’s Shandong 
Province could have been upheld, had China appealed the Panel ruling on land-use 
rights in US-AD/CVD (China). 
 199 For a recent study of the legal problems involved in the use of alternative 
benchmarks in anti-subsidy measures against China, see generally SOPHIA MÜLLER, 
THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS IN ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: A STUDY ON THE WTO, 
THE EU AND CHINA (2018). 
 200 See supra note 171. 
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would lend more legitimacy to CVD measures taken under Section 
15(b).  Due to the permanency of this country-specific derogation 
from the SCM rules (for which no rationale was articulated) and the 
lack of detailed provisions for its application, the recourse to Section 
15(b) can be easily abused in CVD proceedings.  Requiring the 
construction of a domestic benchmark as a necessary step in the 
application of Section 15(b) could help curb such potential abuses. 
3.3.2.4.  The Role of Economics in Alternative Benchmarking 
This Article has proposed two approaches to the construction of 
benchmarks where the government has a (near) monopoly in the 
provision of natural resources: (i) proxies based on production costs 
excluding resource rent; and (ii) proxies based on the optimal use of 
resources via economic modeling.  Both approaches require the use 
of economics instead of relying purely on legal reasoning in the 
interpretation of SCM Article 14(d). 
Given the economic rationale of trade disciplines, it is not 
surprising that economics should play a role in the interpretation 
and application of WTO rules.  Indeed, economic analysis has 
entered WTO dispute settlement in a variety of ways.201  One 
prominent example is US-Upland Cotton, in which Brazil used 
econometric modeling to establish its claim that US cotton subsidies 
caused “significant price depression” of world cotton prices within 
the meaning of SCM Article 6.3(c).202  In that case, the AB recognized 
that economic modeling is “likely to be an important analytical tool” 
in the construction of a counterfactual (i.e., where world prices of 
cotton would have been in the absence of US subsidies to cotton), 
and that “[t]he relative complexity of a model and its parameters is 
                                                             
 201 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Use, Non-Use and Abuse of Economics in 
WTO and Investment Litigation, in WTO LITIGATION, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, AND 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 169 (Huerta-Goldman, Romanetti & Stirnimann eds. 
2013); Chad Bown, The WTO Secretariat and the Role of Economics in Panels and 
Arbitrations, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 391–445 (Bown & Pauwelyn eds. 2010); Thematic Essay: Quantitative 
Economics and the WTO Dispute Settlement, in WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT (2005) 
171–211, 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report05_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/95SQ-X3S2]. 
 202 AB Report, US–Upland Cotton, supra note 83. 
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not a reason for a panel to remain agnostic about them.”203  While 
economics has not yet entered into benchmarking exercises, the AB 
nonetheless has made an explicit call for the use of economic theory 
and empirical evidence in determining the existence of a benefit 
under the SCM Agreement.  Reversing the Panel’s benefit 
determination in US–Large Civil Aircraft, the AB explained its 
decision in these words: 
We recognize that a panel confronted with a measure of the 
kind at issue here may have intuitions as to the consistency 
of the measure with the market, based on economic theory.  
However, we would expect that in such circumstances the 
panel would at least explain the economic rationale or theory that 
supports its intuition.  The Panel in this case did not do so.  
More importantly, we are of the view that a panel should test 
its intuitions empirically, especially where the parties have 
submitted evidence as to how market actors behave.”204 
In light of the above, it is reasonable to expect that the AB would 
welcome the explanation of rent theories with respect to the 
construction of cost-based proxies and would be open to the use of 
economic modeling to construct counterfactuals in estimating the 
proper prices of natural resources for their optimal use.  The benefit 
of relying on economics in the application of SCM rules seems clear.  
Subject to necessary caveats and limits,205 the use of economics may 
enhance the acceptance of WTO rulings by affected parties and the 
general public, thereby contributing to the legitimacy of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. 
The question is whether the resort to economics, as proposed 
herein, is feasible in practice.  With respect to the application of rent 
theory, it would be up to the subsidizing country to propose the 
application.  To do so, the subsidizing country could engage an 
expert economist to expound the basic theory of economic rent in 
the relevant legal proceedings, just as Canada successfully did in the 
Softwood Lumber litigation under the US–Canada Free Trade 
                                                             
 203 AB Report, United States–Upland Cotton (21.5), ¶ 357, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/AB/RW (adopted June 20, 2008). 
 204 AB Report, United States–Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint), ¶ 643, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted March 23, 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 205 See Pauwelyn, supra note 201 (identifying five core caveats and limits: 
economics must be filtered through legal criteria; methodological discipline; 
keeping it simple; due process; and avoiding or disclosing value judgments). 
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Agreement.206  In the event rent calculation is desired,207 it would be 
necessary to provide empirical data to support the calculation.208  
Major CVD target countries, such as China and India, all have many 
well-trained economists and technicians that can help with the task. 
The construction of benchmarks via economic modeling, in 
comparison, may present a greater challenge.  Unlike rent theory, 
which is largely uncontroversial, economic models are built upon 
certain assumptions that may be unrealistic or inaccurate, thus 
exposing the models to disagreement.  Politically, it can be difficult 
to convince CVD investigating authorities to adopt a new approach, 
when their existing methodologies continue to serve their purposes.  
But if their current approach, especially the surrogate country 
method, is found to be WTO-inconsistent, they may become 
amenable to adopt new ones.  The question then is technical 
capability.  The investigating authority would require specialists to 
engage in the economic modeling of foreign subsidizing countries.  
For the top CVD users (the United States, the EU, Canada, and 
Australia209), however, such technical capability should not be an 
issue.210 
In the event that a case is brought to WTO dispute settlement, 
whether by a member suing a subsidizing government directly at 
the multilateral forum or by a subsidizing country challenging a 
                                                             
 206 The testimony of Dr. Nordhaus on the thesis of economic rent was critical 
to the determination by the binational panel in this case.  See Decision of the Panel on 
Remand, supra note 100. 
 207 Rent calculation is not necessary if the tax-equivalent theory of rent is 
accepted. 
 208 Rent calculation can be complex, but it is technically feasible.  See, e.g., 
Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32, at S47 tbl.2 (Available and Captured Rent 
in Wood Products Industry, British Columbia, 1970–1994). 
 209 From January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2017, a total of 486 CVD 
investigations were initiated by WTO members, of which 219 were initiated by the 
United States, 79 by the EU, 65 by Canada and 28 by Australia. Source: WTO, 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm [https://perma.cc/3Q8Y-
UVNC]. 
 210 For example, the International Trade Administration (ITA) of USDOC, the 
US agency in charge of calculating foreign subsidies, employs more than 2,000 staff, 
including an army of trade specialists, economists, accounting and financial 
experts, and business and industry analysts, and has offices in charge of individual 
countries and regions, such as China and the EU, which possess expertise in specific 
jurisdictions.  See generally International Trade Administration, 
https://www.trade.gov/jobs/ [https://perma.cc/H3RB-JM35]; International 
Trade Administration Concordance, https://www.trade.gov/concordance.asp 
[https://perma.cc/8WDA-SZ63]. 
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CVD measure, panels and the AB would have available to them all 
the requisite professional assistance.  The WTO Secretariat employs 
a number of economists and trade specialists for research,211 who 
can assist the adjudicators in examining economic evidence and 
assessing the quality of economic analysis and models.  In addition, 
the WTO may engage external experts to advise in specific 
disputes.212 
In sum, using economics in the construction of alternative 
benchmarks is technically viable at both national and WTO levels.  
Ultimately, it would depend on the willingness of the members to 
adopt the approach. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Government provision of natural resources has provoked major 
trade disputes over the issue of subsidies.  Yet, how to identify a 
subsidy where the government is the sole or predominant supplier 
remains unsettled under WTO law, due to controversy over 
benchmarking.  To avoid circularity in reasoning (where the 
domestic market price is the government monopoly price), it is 
necessary to resort to alternative benchmarks in the situation.  
Although the Appellate Body has articulated certain principles and 
made some suggestions, what has prevailed in practice is the use of 
external market prices as the benchmark to identify subsidies in the 
country of provision.  Relying on this approach, the United States 
has found countervailable subsidies in the provision of timber in 
Canada based on US timber prices, of land in China based on land 
prices in Thailand, of minerals in India based on prices of Australian 
and Brazilian producers, and of timber in Indonesia on the prices of 
timber from Malaysia. 
                                                             
 211 As of December 31, 2017, of the total 620 posts (excluding management) at 
the WTO Secretariat, 37 were at the Economic Research and Statistics Division.  
Source: WTO, Overview of the WTO Secretariat, 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm [https://perma.cc/R6XB-
7QV8]. 
 212 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU) art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing dispute settlement 
panels with the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual 
and any relevant source and to consult experts on technical matters raised by a 
party). 
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The approach of using external benchmarks to identify subsidies 
in the provision of natural resources, however, is fundamentally 
flawed, as it disregards the most basic source of comparative 
advantage of a trading nation—its natural endowment.  Legally, this 
approach was accepted once by the panel in the case of Chinese land 
but has never been endorsed by the Appellate Body.  Instead, the AB 
has cautioned that it would be difficult in practice to “replicate 
reliably” market conditions prevailing in one country based on 
market conditions prevailing in another country.  The “replicate 
reliably” standard, arguably, is the one suggested by the AB for the 
use of an alternative benchmark under SCM Article 14(d), which 
provides that the “adequacy of remuneration” to the government 
provider “shall be determined in relation to prevailing market 
conditions for the good or service in question in the country of 
provision.”  In order to meet this standard, it would be necessary to 
construct the alternative benchmark based on domestic conditions. 
The question remains as to the specific approach to the 
construction of such a benchmark.  Applying the economic theory 
of resource rent and considering the generally accepted policy 
objective of optimal use of natural resources, this Article has 
proposed two alternatives: the construction of benchmark on the 
basis of production costs excluding resource rent, and the 
construction on the basis of optimal use via economic modeling.  The 
key conclusions are as follows: 
(1)  Among the several alternative benchmarks suggested by the 
WTO adjudicators, a proxy constructed on the basis of production 
costs is the most appropriate.  That is because production costs 
(including costs of labor, capital, raw materials, overhead and a 
normal profit margin) typically incur within the country, and as 
such, can most reliably reflect the prevailing market conditions in 
the country of provision. 
In the context of constructing a cost-based benchmark for the 
provision of natural resources, it is necessary to recognize the issue 
of resource rent.  The price of resource products typically includes 
resource rent.  Unlike components of production costs, resource rent 
does not represent any human effort; instead, it arises purely from 
natural endowment.  According to Ricardian theory, because the 
supply of natural resources is limited by nature, the price of resource 
products, and correspondingly the amount of rent available from a 
resource, is determined by the market demand only.  Thus, resource 
rent is not part of the production costs for the government provision 
of natural resources and should be excluded from a cost-based 
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benchmark.  Calculation of resource rent in each case, however, can 
be complex. 
(2)  Conceptually, it is more appropriate to characterize resource 
rent uncollected by the government as “foregone government 
revenue” under SCM Article 1.1, than as “inadequate remuneration” 
for the provision of goods under SCM Article 14(d).  When the 
government is by law the owner of all natural resources within its 
territory, its right to collect resource rent is not fundamentally 
different from its power to collect taxes.  Like taxes, rent does not 
represent the value of any productive effort; instead, it is merely a 
fiscal instrument of the government to collect revenue based on its 
sovereign authority.  Thus, when the government does not collect 
all the resource rent available, it should be deemed as a situation of 
“government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not 
collected” within the meaning of SCM Article 1.1(a)(1).  
Accordingly, whether the foregone rent confers a benefit should be 
determined in the same manner as foregone tax revenue.  As in the 
case of tax revenue, there can be no market benchmark or external 
benchmark for determining what is the resource rent “otherwise 
due.”  Instead, the benchmark has to be a standard set by the 
government itself, subject only to the principle of 
nondiscrimination. 
From a normative perspective, in a system of public ownership 
of natural resources, the government is entrusted to manage the use 
of resources in the public interest.  So long as the government does 
not discriminate among users, any resource rent “foregone” by the 
government will benefit the users in the same way as other public 
services provided by the government, such as infrastructure, 
education or healthcare.  Instead of being man-made advantages, 
the advantage derived from the resource rent foregone by the 
government arises purely from the nation’s natural endowment. 
Interestingly, the above analysis merely confirms the wisdom of 
draft Article 14(e) of the SCM Agreement contemplated during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.  Aimed at the natural resource sector, 
Article 14(e) set forth a broad principle: “When the government is 
the sole provider or purchaser of the good or service in question, the 
provision or purchase of such good or service shall not be 
considered as conferring a benefit, unless the government 
discriminates among users or providers of the good or service.”  It 
is unfortunate that this provision, originally proposed by the United 
States, was deleted from the final draft of the SCM Agreement 
without much discussion. 
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(3)  As an alternative to the cost-based benchmark, which gives 
rise to the issue of rent, domestic benchmarks can be constructed on 
the basis of the optimal use of natural resources.  The idea is to 
construct a counterfactual situation in which the in-country price of 
the government monopoly is set at a level to achieve the optimal use 
of natural resources and sustainable development.  The construction 
of such a counterfactual would require the use of economic 
modeling, an approach that has already been embraced by the 
Appellate Body in the application of the SCM Agreement.  The 
various models developed by Chinese economists to estimate the 
proper price level of industrial land in China offer a good example 
of this approach.  Using domestic data and accepting certain 
domestic systemic constraints, the models were able to identify the 
distortion of land prices in different locales in China.  In contrast to 
external market prices, the price benchmarks produced by this 
approach are intrinsic to the country of provision. 
Compared to the cost-based approach, benchmarking based on 
optimal use is more aggressive in exerting the authority of global 
governance, as it aims at identifying and correcting market 
distortions within the subsidizing country.  This more aggressive 
approach can have broad implications for addressing the problem 
of subsidization in China.  For countries complaining about the 
extensive role of the Chinese government in the economy, the use of 
this approach would lend more legitimacy to their unilateral CVD 
measures against China, especially if such measures are taken 
pursuant to the special provisions of China’s Accession Protocol.  
For China, the external pressure from the world trading system 
could be leveraged to push for further domestic reform, leading to 
more efficient allocation of resources at home. 
In the final analysis, both benchmarking approaches proposed 
herein are consistent with the letter and spirit of WTO regulation, 
and either of them would lead to a more reasonable application of 
the SCM Agreement than that currently prevailing.  Grounded in 
basic economic theory and methodology, these new approaches are 
capable of producing results that would be accepted as generally fair 
and objective, thereby enhancing security and predictability in 
international trade relations. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/2
